



ZIMBABWE RHODESIA

**REPORT OF THE  
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE  
Rhodesians Worldwide  
LANCASTER HOUSE  
LONDON**

**SEPTEMBER-DECEMBER, 1979**

Lancaster House  
21st December, 1979  
Cmd. R.ZR. 3—1980.]

ZIMBABWE RHODESIA

CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE HELD AT LANCASTER  
HOUSE, LONDON

SEPTEMBER-DECEMBER, 1979

REPORT

1. Following the Meeting of Commonwealth Heads of Government held in Lusaka from 1st to 7th August, Her Majesty's Government issued invitations to Bishop Muzorewa and the leaders of the Patriotic Front to participate in a Constitutional Conference at Lancaster House. The purpose of the Conference was to discuss and reach agreement on the terms of an Independence Constitution, and that elections should be supervised under British authority to enable Rhodesia to proceed to legal independence and the parties to settle their differences by political means.

2. The Conference opened on 10th September under the chairmanship of Lord Carrington, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. The Conference concluded on 15th December, after 47 plenary sessions. A list of the official delegates to the Conference is at Annex A. The text of Lord Carrington's opening address is at Annex B, together with statements by Mr. Nkomo on behalf of his and Mr. Mugabe's delegation and by Bishop Muzorewa on behalf of his delegation.

3. In the course of its proceedings the Conference reached agreement on the following issues—

- a Summary of the Independence Constitution (attached as Annex C to this report)<sup>1 2</sup>;
- arrangements for the pre-independence period (Annex D)<sup>2</sup>;
- a cease-fire agreement signed by the parties (Annex E).

<sup>1</sup> The Constitution, which was enacted by Order in Council on 6th December, 1979, gives full effect to this Summary.

<sup>2</sup> The text of the Summary of the Independence Constitution and of the pre-Independence arrangements were published as Annexures I and II respectively to the White Paper "Zimbabwe Rhodesia—Proposals for Independence"—Cmd. R.ZR. 18—1979 and has not been reproduced in this publication.



4. In concluding this agreement and signing this report the parties undertake—

- (a) to accept the authority of the Governor;
- (b) to abide by the Independence Constitution;
- (c) to comply with the pre-independence arrangements;
- (d) to abide by the cease-fire agreement;
- (e) to campaign peacefully and without intimidation;
- (f) to renounce the use of force for political ends;
- (g) to accept the outcome of the elections and instruct any forces under their authority to do the same.

Signed at Lancaster House, London, this twenty-first day of December, 1979.

.....  
Lord Carrington

.....  
Sir I. Gilmour, Bt.

.....  
Bishop A. T. Muzorewa

.....  
Mr. R. G. Mugabe

.....  
Dr. S. C. Mundawarara

.....  
Mr. J. M. Nkomo

Rhodesians Worldwide

Rhodesians Worldwide

## LIST OF DELEGATES

*United Kingdom Delegation*

Lord Carrington (Chairman)  
 Sir I. Gilmour, Bt.  
 Sir M. Havers\*  
 Lord Harlech\*  
 Mr. R. Luce  
 Sir M. Palliser  
 Sir A. Duff\*  
 Mr. D. M. Day  
 Mr. R. A. C. Byatt\*  
 Mr. R. W. Renwick  
 Mr. P. R. N. Fifoot  
 Mr. N. M. Fenn  
 Mr. G. G. H. Walden  
 Mr. C. D. Powell  
 Mr. P. J. Barlow  
 Mr. R. D. Wilkinson  
 Mr. A. M. Layden  
 Mr. R. M. J. Lyne  
 Mr. M. J. Richardson\*  
 Mr. C. R. L. de Chassiron\*  
 Mrs. A. J. Phillips\*  
 Mr. M. C. Wood

\* Replaced by Sir J. Graham, Mr. S. J. Gomersall, Gen. M. Farndale, Mr. R. Jackling, Col. A. Gurdon, Col. C. Dunphie and Mr. B. Watkins for some sessions of the Conference.

*Mr. Mugabe, Mr. Nkomo and Delegation*

Mr. R. G. Mugabe	Mr. J. M. Nkomo
Mr. S. V. Muzenda	Mr. J. M. Chinamano
Mr. E. Z. Tekere	Mr. J. W. Msika
Gen. J. M. Tongogara	Mr. T. G. Silundika*
Mr. E. R. Kadungure	Mr. A. M. Chambati
Dr. H. Ushewokunze	Mr. John Nkomo*
Mr. D. Mutumbuka	Mr. L. Baron*
Mr. J. Tungamirai	Mr. S. K. Sibanda*
Mr. E. Zvobgo	Mr. E. Mlambo*
Mr. S. Mubako*	Mr. C. Ndlovu*
Mr. W. Kamba	Miss E. Siziba

\* Replaced by Mr. W. Musarurwa, Mr. D. Dabengwa, Mr. A. Ndlovu, Mr. R. Austin, Mr. R. Mpoko, Mr. R. Manyika and Mr. L. Mafela for some sessions of the Conference.

*Bishop Muzorewa and Delegation*

Bishop A. T. Muzorewa  
 Dr. S. C. Mundawarara  
 Mr. E. L. Bulle  
 Mr. F. Zindoga  
 Mr. D. C. Mukome\*  
 Mr. G. B. Nyandoro\*  
 Rev. N. Sithole  
 Mr. L. Nyemba\*  
 Chief K. Ndiweni  
 Mr. Z. M. Bafanah\*  
 Mr. I. D. Smith  
 Mr. D. C. Smith  
 Mr. R. Cronjé  
 Mr. C. Andersen  
 Dr. J. Kamusikiri  
 Mr. G. Pincus\*  
 Mr. L. G. Smith  
 Air Vice Marshal H. Hawkins  
 Mr. D. Zamchiya  
 Mr. S. V. Mutambanengwe  
 Mr. M. A. Adam  
 Mr. P. Claypole

\* Replaced by Mr. A. R. McMillan, Mr. D. V. M. Bradley, Gen. P. Walls, Mr. K. Flower and Mr. P. K. Allum for some sessions of the Conference.

*Secretariat*

Mr. J. M. Willson  
 Mr. R. S. Dewar



OPENING SPEECHES BY LORD CARRINGTON (CHAIRMAN),  
MR. NKOMO AND BISHOP MUZOREWA

**Lord Carrington:** I am glad to welcome you to this Conference and to open its proceedings.

When the British Government issued invitations to this Conference on 14th August, after extensive consultations, we naturally hoped for and expected a positive response. Our consultations had revealed a strong desire that the United Kingdom should take the initiative in making a further attempt to achieve a final settlement of the problem of Rhodesia, in fulfilment of its constitutional responsibilities. There was also a widespread feeling that continuation or intensification of the war was not in the best interests of any of the parties to the dispute, nor of the people of Rhodesia as a whole. Nevertheless, it is not a simple matter for those who have been involved in a bitter and tragic military confrontation to sit round a conference table together. The British Government felt strongly that it had the responsibility to bring that about.

When inviting you here we appealed to you, in the interests of the people of Rhodesia, to approach these negotiations in a positive spirit and to seek to build up areas of agreement. We hope thereby to lay the foundations for a free, independent and democratic society in which all the people of Rhodesia, irrespective of their race or political beliefs, would be able to live in security and at peace with each other and with their neighbours. The act of coming together is important. It is now up to us to build on that.

Since 1965, and indeed long before, many meetings have been held to try to resolve this problem. I am under no illusions, nor are any of my colleagues with me under any illusion, about the magnitude of the task before us. The problem is one which has defeated the efforts of successive British Governments, all of whom sought to achieve the objective of a peaceful settlement in conditions which would guarantee to the people of Rhodesia the full enjoyment of their rights. But I have no intention of going back over the history of those attempts; and I hope that you also will be prepared to look to the future rather than to the past.

I would like to hope that there is a difference between this meeting and those which have preceded it. This is a constitutional conference, the purpose of which is to decide the proper basis for the granting of

legal independence to the people of Rhodesia. Many conferences like this have been held in this very building. A great many former dependent territories of the United Kingdom have successfully made the transition to independent statehood on the basis of constitutions agreed here. It is our intention to approach this Conference on the basis of the same principles and with no less strong a determination to succeed than in the case of those other conferences, which resulted in the granting of independence by this country to our former dependent territories. I believe that we can take some pride in the part we have played at conferences held at Lancaster House in the process of decolonisation. As Commonwealth leaders agreed at Lusaka, Britain has had no lack of experience as a decolonising power.

The agreement reached at Lusaka has made it possible for the British Government to convene this Conference with the very real hope that it will lead to an internationally acceptable settlement. I would like to pay tribute to the Commonwealth Heads of Government and the Commonwealth Secretary-General, all of whom worked so hard at Lusaka to establish an agreed position. In summary, the Commonwealth Heads of Government at Lusaka confirmed that they were wholly committed to genuine majority rule for the people of Rhodesia, and accepted that this requires the adoption of a democratic constitution including appropriate safeguards for minorities. They reiterated that it is the responsibility of the British Government to grant legal independence to Rhodesia. They agreed that the government formed under the independence constitution must be chosen through free and fair elections, properly supervised under British Government authority, and with Commonwealth observers. They welcomed the British Government's intention to convene this Conference, and recognised that the search for a settlement must involve all parties to the conflict. We should do well, I think, to bear in mind throughout our discussions the framework thus set out in the Lusaka communique. Not only does it incorporate the views of the British Government, but it sets out the approach which the Commonwealth will support and which will gain international acceptance.

Against this background I approach the search for a fair constitutional settlement in Rhodesia with the conviction that it is illusory to think that any settlement can fully satisfy the requirements of either side. An agreement can only be reached if there is a willingness to compromise.

The British Government has put to you an outline of the kind of constitution on the basis of which we would be prepared to grant independence. We wish to discuss these proposals with you at this



Conference, and will be prepared to elaborate them in the light of our discussions. If we can reach agreement at this Conference, there will be an end to the war. That is an outcome which I believe will be greeted with immense relief by the people of Rhodesia and throughout Africa. Rhodesia will proceed to legal independence with a government formed by whichever party and whichever leader can show that they command the confidence of the people. I must confess that I find it difficult to see how any party or group or leader can hope to benefit from what would follow failure to reach agreement along the general lines we have put before you, and those who would suffer most would be the people of Rhodesia, towards whom our real responsibility lies.

A quarter of the population of Rhodesia has been born since 1965. Their lives have been overshadowed, not merely by a tragic and unnecessary political dispute, but by armed conflict. Many of them have died as innocent victims of the war. Or they have lost their parents, or their brothers or their sisters. Or they have lost their homes. Many of them, black and white, face the prospect of themselves having to fight, on one side or the other, or of being deprived indefinitely of peaceful residence in the land of their birth—a quarter of a million people are now in refugee camps in other countries. If we, who are assembled in this room, cannot agree on a way to end the fighting and to provide for you to settle your differences by political means, this is what will happen.

This generation now at risk had no part in the initial causes of the conflict. It was not born when the problem of Rhodesia came to a crisis in 1965. But now there is acceptance by all the parties of a society free from racial discrimination, of universal suffrage and majority rule. We can make this objective a reality if—and only if—we are prepared to look at the problems on the basis of principles on which both sides should be able to agree. I believe that the people assembled in this room have it in their power to end the war and to enable the people of Rhodesia to decide their future by peaceful means. We—you and I—bear a heavy responsibility, and I do not believe that the people of Rhodesia will readily forgive any party which deprives them of this opportunity to settle their future by peaceful means. That is a thought which should be in all our minds throughout the whole of this Conference.

It is, I must say, a matter of great regret and disappointment to me and my colleagues that hostilities are continuing during this Conference. Progress towards agreement on political issues—which I hope we are all determined to achieve—will by definition mean progress towards removing the causes of the war. It must be our objective to proceed as soon as possible to a stage at which there can be agreement on a ceasefire.

We shall fall short of what we ought to achieve for the people of Rhodesia if we do not give them a chance to make a fresh start, its causes and its consequences put firmly in the past.

Gentlemen, Britain has at times, and variously, been described on the one side as choosing to stand with arms folded on the touchline; and on the other as not being serious in its determination to decolonize. Let me assure you today, if anyone is in any doubt, that we could not be more serious in our intention to achieve a satisfactory basis for the granting of legal independence for the people of Rhodesia, and in this attempt to bring about an end to the war.

Since we were elected the government of this country at the beginning of May we have engaged in extensive consultations on the best way of achieving these objectives. Lord Harlech visited Africa early in the life of this Government to consult with the parties to the dispute and with the Commonwealth and other African governments most closely concerned. He found a general conviction that a solution to the problem of bringing Rhodesia to legal independence must stem from Britain as the constitutionally responsible authority, and that we must put forward proposals to achieve that objective. He also found that there was criticism of the present constitutional arrangements, in particular of the blocking power given to the white minority over a wide range of legislation, and of the character of the Public Service and other Commissions.

In the period of consultations, we made it clear that we would attach particular importance to the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting at Lusaka. At Lusaka the British Prime Minister said that the British Government were wholly committed to genuine majority rule in Rhodesia. The principle of majority rule has been accepted by all the delegates at this Conference. The Prime Minister, at Lusaka, also recognized the importance of encouraging the European minority to remain as an integral part of the community. The Prime Minister emphasized that Britain fully accepted its constitutional responsibility to bring Rhodesia to legal independence on a basis of justice and democracy, comparable with the arrangements we have made for the independence of other countries.

The British Government took action immediately to give effect to the Lusaka declaration by convening this Conference and by putting forward constitutional proposals in accordance with the principles which were agreed at Lusaka and which have formed the basis for other independence constitutions in Africa and elsewhere.

The constitution is the fundamental problem to which we must address ourselves. I am of course well aware that there are other aspects



of a settlement which must in due course be resolved. But it is essential to the prospects of success that we should first seek agreement on our destination—which is the independence constitution. If that can be achieved it will be necessary to decide the arrangements to give effect to that agreement. The British Government has stated clearly that it will be prepared to accept its full share of the responsibility for the practical implementation of those arrangements. The central element will be free and fair elections, properly supervised under British Government authority.

The British Government's outline proposals for an independence constitution have been before you for four weeks. I did not suggest that this Conference should be held on the basis of prior acceptance of this document. Instead, I would like to take the document as the starting point for our discussions. The British Government have been asked to put forward proposals and we have done so. Unless there is a focus for our discussion it will be impossible to make progress.

There are certain general points which I would make in introducing them.

First, as the constitutional authority for Southern Rhodesia, the United Kingdom intends to take direct responsibility for the independence constitution. What you have before you are the British Government's proposals, taking account of the points made to us in our consultations. They are intended to give effect to the principles which have been accepted by successive British Governments as the proper basis for independence, and you will recollect them very clearly. They are that the principle of majority rule must be maintained and guaranteed; that there must be guarantees against retrogressive amendments to the constitution; that there should be immediate improvement in the political status of the African population; that racial discrimination is unacceptable; that we must ensure that, regardless of race, there is no oppression of majority by minority or of minority by majority; and that what is agreed must be shown to be acceptable to the people of Rhodesia.

Second, our proposals are comparable to the basis on which the United Kingdom has granted independence to other former dependent territories, in particular those in Africa. We have no doubt, therefore, that a solution on this basis will be accepted by the international community, as giving effect to the principles we have accepted in granting independence to other former dependent territories. In the case of Rhodesia, as in all other cases, a constitution must take account of special circumstances. But the broad lines of independence constitutions are clear enough; and in the precedents there are points which can help us towards a solution, for example on the representation of minorities.

Third, we have made it unequivocally clear that our constitutional proposals represent in outline the kind of constitution on the basis of which the British Government would be prepared to grant legal independence. If agreement could be reached on alternative proposals which meet the British Government's criteria, we would be ready to grant independence on that basis. But we believe that the best hope of success lies in negotiation on the lines we have proposed, in accordance with the Commonwealth declaration.

If it is possible to get agreement on the general framework for the independence constitution, the British Government will be prepared to put forward more detailed proposals to give effect to that agreement. We shall therefore have further suggestions to put before the Conference. But, before we advance to that stage, we must establish what measure of agreement exists on the outline proposals, and where the major difficulties, if any, will lie. As the first step, therefore, I shall hope to hear your views on the outline proposals.

Before inviting you, in our next session—because I think it would be appropriate to leave it to the next session—to state your positions on the constitutional framework for independence, I would like very briefly to speak about the arrangements to give effect to an agreement on the constitution.

In other countries approaching independence, the United Kingdom's role has invariably been to establish just conditions for independence, and not to encourage the aspirations of this or that party. Our role in Rhodesia will be the same as in other dependent territories. The international community is well aware of this and of our constitutional responsibility. In many countries we have handed over power to people who had previously been confirmed opponents of the policy of the United Kingdom, if they have been elected by the people of their countries. In the position which we agreed with other Commonwealth Governments at Lusaka, we stated that there must be free and fair elections, properly supervised under British Government authority and with Commonwealth observers. This has been accepted by all Commonwealth Governments; and, as I have already said, the British Government will be ready to carry out its responsibilities in this regard.

I turn now briefly to the way in which we might proceed at this Conference. The Conference is being held under my Chairmanship. I attach the highest priority to bringing it to a successful conclusion, and I assure you I intend to play the fullest part in the proceedings. At times when I am prevented from being here, I would propose to ask the Lord Privy Seal, Sir Ian Gilmour, to take the Chair.

We have made no attempt to fix the duration of the Conference. I hope that we can move forward rapidly. I trust that we can show



real progress towards agreement on the constitution. We for our part are prepared to continue for as long as it is necessary, provided of course that progress is being made. In the opening plenary sessions I would ask you to set out fully your views on constitutional questions and on the outline proposals before the Conference, as I have done. Depending on the progress made, it might then be appropriate to consider aspects of the constitution in more detail, perhaps on the basis of further proposals tabled by the British Government. We may also wish to consider meeting in less formal groups at different levels. We shall have between us to decide on that as we proceed.

The Conference Secretariat, headed by the Conference Secretary, Mr. Willson, is at the service of all delegates. Any questions on administrative arrangements should be referred to Mr. Willson and the Conference Officers assisting him.

The Secretariat will prepare summary records of discussions in the formal Conference sessions, that is to say, records which give a resume of the main points made by each speaker. They will circulate these records within 24 hours. If you wish to make corrections of substance to your own interventions I would be grateful if you would do so within two days. These will also be circulated. The summary records will not be made available to the press.

There will — and I dare say you have already seen it — be world-wide interest in the progress of the Conference. A great many journalists have been accredited to it. I shall be making public my own statement this afternoon; you may wish to do the same with your opening speeches. The press will not be admitted to Lancaster House, but there is a fully equipped press centre just across the road. This is at the disposal of all delegations. Mr. Fenn will act as my spokesman as Chairman of the Conference. He will also release to the press any joint statements on which we may from time to time agree, and I invite each delegation, if they would be so good, to nominate a member of their staff as Press Secretary, to be in touch with Mr. Fenn about these matters. They will of course be welcome to use the facilities at the press centre.

If there are other papers which you wish to have circulated to all participants, the Secretariat will be ready to have them reproduced and distributed as Conference documents.

May I say this in conclusion. This Conference has been convened in response to the statement agreed by the Commonwealth Heads of Government at Lusaka. We have put forward proposals designed to bring Rhodesia to legal independence. Your acceptance of our invitation has given hope to the people of Rhodesia and the neighbouring countries.

It is within the power of the parties represented here to bring an end to the war.

I have deliberately avoided talking of a "last chance" of a settlement. Last chances have come and gone before. But I would put it differently. Since Geneva, the conflict has reached new levels. The cost of continuing it is very high. Since 1976 the number of men under arms on both sides has more than doubled. The war has spread into neighbouring states. The toll in casualties inside Rhodesia and in the neighbouring countries has continued to rise. Neither side has infinite resources. The price of failure at this Conference would be further prolonged bloodshed and further destruction of the life of whole communities. The responsibility for preventing this lies upon all those present here, and the eyes of the international community will be upon us all to see that we live up to that responsibility. The British Government is determined for its part to do everything in its power to bring this Conference to a successful conclusion. It is in that spirit that I ask all of you to address the task before us.

Now, gentlemen, having said that, I think the best thing that we can do is to adjourn until 10.30 tomorrow morning when I hope we shall hear the considered views on what I have said from the two sides; of course there is no limit on the number of those who can speak. Perhaps we might then adjourn now, and I hope very much to see as many of you as can come this evening, when we are having a small party downstairs.

Thank you very much.

**Mr. Nkomo:** Mr. Chairman, first I would like to apologise to the Conference, through you, that we in the first place requested that we had some time, as given in our letter, and secondly that we still were late. We apologise for that to the Conference.

Mr. Chairman, the Patriotic Front is going to give a statement that represents the Front. Mr. Mugabe and myself are presenting this statement on behalf of our group.

The Patriotic Front, deeply conscious of the need to bring an end to racism and colonialism which continue to plague the people of Zimbabwe, welcomes the British Government's stated aim to assist in this task of decolonization. We have come to London to attend this Conference in response to the invitation recently extended to us by you, Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the British Government. For us our presence here is by itself an act of immense sacrifice. The scarce material resources we have had to divert and the manpower we must of necessity tie down in London



for the duration of this Conference should be enough evidence of our seriousness and good faith. We have always said that we will leave no stone unturned in our struggle for the total liquidation of colonialism in Zimbabwe.

In particular we welcome the fact that the British Government now states that it is prepared to help bring genuine majority rule to our country, Zimbabwe. We are anxious to discover whether that is in fact the intention. Equally we wish to make our position absolutely clear and understood in order to facilitate frank and meaningful discussions.

The unique reality of the situation is that for many years now a major war of national liberation has been raging in our country. This arose from the single tragic fact that Britain failed to meet her decolonization responsibilities even in the face of the continuing of flagrant illegal acts of the secular minority which challenges the people of Zimbabwe to take up arms and decolonize themselves. Thus we are faced with the task of a peace Conference.

British secular colonization in Zimbabwe presented special problems which did not disappear by being ignored for decades. The war is an additional special problem and cannot be ignored if it is to end.

To achieve decolonization comparable to that in other Commonwealth states we must first achieve the basic conditions for the movement to independence which existed in those countries. That was peace, safety and security for all, in the context of which an independent state would be governed according to the agreed constitution by a government elected by a people who were essentially free and secure when they chose their government. That essential preliminary situation does not yet prevail in Zimbabwe and even an accepted and agreed constitution will not create it. It is our basic task here to create those conditions.

Mr. Chairman, the extent and character of the war of national liberation must be made perfectly clear. Ninety per cent. of the country is covered by this war: the towns and cities are surrounded by and often penetrated by the armed struggle. Parts of the country the regime has written off and abandoned: these we term the liberated areas. In other areas the regime can only achieve a temporary daily presence with punitive raids on the villages: these we term the semi-liberated areas. The remaining contested areas include the towns and the citadels of the regime which we are poised to conquer. Thus the Patriotic Front has now responsibilities not only to fight but also to ensure peace, order and good government—the “problem of success”—inside Zimbabwe.

Clearly it is not our purpose in coming to London to betray or abandon any of these victories of the people of Zimbabwe who have

partly liberated themselves and are continuing the task precisely because Britain failed to carry out her responsibilities.

This Conference is not only unique in British colonial history because it must achieve peace as well as a future constitution: it is unique because this is the first time that two decolonising forces have to co-operate in this task. The Patriotic Front representing the people of Zimbabwe are here as the effective decolonising factor, while Britain is here asserting her diminished legal authority. In this connection it must be pointed out that Britain, despite its claimed experience in decolonization has had no success in Zimbabwe or did not give any determined effort. The task has had to be undertaken by the people themselves. Through their sweat and blood the process is well on its way. The most positive proof of this is the admission of Britain's agent in the form of the declaration of martial law in over nearly 90 per cent. of the total area of the country.

Yet we are more aware than any of the destruction and tragic toll of our struggle, of the regime's continued ability and increasing determination to wreak havoc and mass destruction. It is thus our vital responsibility to achieve genuine independence, thereby bringing about peace and putting an end to the prevailing anarchy and chaos. This is no longer a solely British responsibility; we must—and our presence here demonstrates our will to do so—work together with Britain.

We have stated before and we repeat the fact that the Patriotic Front and the achievements of the Zimbabwean people are essential factors in the decolonizing process. We have to do this together. This is vital.

The task of this peace Conference is to ensure through an indivisible comprehensive agreement the irreversible transfer of power to the people of Zimbabwe. This is one continuous interdependent process. It is complex but does not lend itself to piecemeal treatment. The critical period leading to independence is as vital as the independence constitution itself. In practice the task of creating a suitable constitution for the crucial transitional period will serve the ultimate task of agreeing a constitutional model for independence for our country and assist us in that undertaking in understanding one another's constitutional preferences. There must be no doubt about the freedom and fairness of the context of pre-independence elections. As the recent history of our land so eloquently demonstrates, treachery, tribalism and mass murder is all that can result from a false solution. To accept such a Zimbabwe would be a betrayal of our people, of our principles and quite simply (since dead and detained men can neither canvass nor cast votes) a betrayal of ourselves. We must remember here that it has always been, and it remains, the basic



objective of the Patriotic Front to ensure that government of a genuine free Zimbabwe is based upon free and fair elections. We have said this, Mr. Chairman, several times. We were the initiators of the principle of universal adult suffrage in Zimbabwe, in the face of its constant rejection by Britain herself and the minority regime in that country.

Zimbabwe must be a sovereign republic in which the sovereign nation pursues its own destiny, totally unshackled by any fetters or constraints.

The sovereign Zimbabwean people must, acting through their own freely chosen representatives in parliament, be free and fully vested with the power to exercise complete dominion over resources from time to time as need arises. They must be free to reorganize the social, political and economic institutions and structures and be free to shape their own destiny as a nation without having to pander to any racial, ethnic, tribal, religious, social or other interests or differences.

The safety and survival of the republic must be the sacred trust of the Zimbabwean nation, not the pawn in the hands of mercenaries and other alien adventurers and agents. We are irrevocably committed to the position that the Zimbabwean people, by whose blood and sacrifice colonialism was exorcised from the land, must themselves be the perpetual guarantors of sovereignty in the face of all challenges, domestic or foreign. Liberation and the process leading thereto must, once agreed, be irrevocable and irreversible. We know no other way of ensuring this than strict adherence to the principle that the people and their forces who have toppled minority rule must be entrusted with the task of ensuring that colonialism, under whatever guise, will not return to plague the nation once again.

Justice will not occur by accident in a sovereign Zimbabwe, nor will its administration and dispensation remain in the hands of privileged minority. It must conform to the social and cultural values of the Zimbabwean people themselves.

The socio-economic system must conform to the people's sense of justice, democracy and fair play.

These and similar goals, cherished vigorously by our people, and for which thousands now lie in mass graves throughout Zimbabwe, Zambia, Moçambique, Botswana and Angola must not be betrayed or compromised. In the past many people present here in Lancaster House, but who are now our antagonists cherished them too. It is personal ambition and greed that propelled them into betrayal and treason. We are sworn not to follow their example.

At this stage, Mr. Chairman, having seen both the British proposals and yesterday's statement by Lord Carrington, we find the British pro-

posals are too vague for us to judge whether they are adequate to our comprehensive task. The British Government must now be prepared to take us into their confidence and show us what their real proposals are. This is very essential if we are to discuss with clarity of mind. The present outline states no more than some of the elements of any constitution but contains also certain aspects which are very different from the normal British pattern and are also seriously retrogressive as compared with earlier British proposals such as the Anglo-American proposals.

It avoids the real issues which should be brought before this Conference and solved. Only by dealing with them can we hope to leave here and return to freedom and the prospect of peace and tranquillity in our country, Zimbabwe.

The essential questions we have posed constantly to ourselves and which we insist must be understood by all seriously concerned with a solution include the following:

1. Will the people of Zimbabwe be really sovereign and be able to exercise their sovereign authority?
2. Whose army shall defend Zimbabwe and its people? It must be noted here that 60 per cent. of the present white army are mercenaries.
3. Whose police force shall protect the people of Zimbabwe?
4. What type of administration and judiciary shall serve the people of our country, Zimbabwe?
5. Will any ethnic, religious, tribal or other group be able to hold the rest of the people of Zimbabwe hostage?
6. How do we create the situation for the holding of free and fair elections?
7. Whose laws will govern such elections?
8. In particular, apart from the British supervisors and the Commonwealth observers, who will administer the elections and ensure the safety of the voters and candidates?
9. What will be the future of the people's land?

These and similar issues are those which should be placed on the agenda of this Conference and before the world if real peace is to return to our beloved Zimbabwe. The time for evasion is long past and we insist that the final phase of decolonization be seriously pursued now by the British and by ourselves.



We have won that position by our own sacrifice, our own struggle, our own blood. We are not requesting anybody to bestow this right on us. We have done it ourselves. We continue to do it.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

**Bishop Muzorewa:** Mr. Chairman, it gives our delegation great pleasure to be in this historic building representing the democratically elected government of Zimbabwe Rhodesia, seeking recognition and the lifting of sanctions.

I must first, on behalf of my delegation and on my own behalf, say how grateful we all are to Her Majesty's Government for the hospitality accorded us, the spirit in which we have been received here and, above all, for the opportunity to resolve, once and for all, the constitutional problems facing our country.

I was pleased to accept the invitation to attend this constitutional Conference and to lead the delegation of our Government of National Unity, because it enables me to report officially and in person to the British Government and the British people that we have fulfilled all the requirements insisted upon by successive British administrations. This being so, it is up to the British Government to recognise the new reality of the situation in our country and to act accordingly.

It is now the responsibility of your government, Mr. Chairman, to accept and acknowledge this fact. You, Mr. Chairman, have referred to the laying of foundations for a free, independent and democratic society. We would suggest that those foundations have already been laid, and Britain has a legal and moral duty in the name of democracy, integrity and fair play to follow its own hallowed principles and recognize the new popularly elected government in our country which is of the people, by the people and for the people.

Let me examine, Mr. Chairman, the present situation in relation to the five principles listed by the British Government in 1965 and the sixth subsequently added in 1966. I might add, at this stage, that these principles have received general approval by other countries and were even endorsed by the United Nations Organization.

Those principles were—

- (a) unimpeded progress to majority rule must be maintained and guaranteed;
- (b) there must be guarantees against retrogressive amendment to the constitution;

- (c) there must be an immediate improvement in the political status of the black population;
- (d) there must be progress towards ending racial discrimination;
- (e) the constitutional proposals must be acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole; and
- (f) there must be no oppression of the majority by the minority or of the minority by the majority.

In connection with these six principles, universal adult suffrage has been accepted and introduced in our country and this change cannot be reversed. Thus, the political status of the black population has been fulfilled and majority rule is enshrined in the constitution. No retrogressive amendments can be made without the approval of the black representatives in Parliament. Racial discrimination has been totally abolished and there is no question but that the changes which have been brought about in our country are accepted by the people as a whole. There is in our country today no oppression of the majority by the minority or of the minority by the majority. I can confidently state therefore, Mr. Chairman, that the requirements of previous British Governments have been fully satisfied and nothing should now stand in the way of our Government of Zimbabwe Rhodesia being granted their rightful recognition.

Let us accept one further fact. The reasons which led to the British and subsequent international action against our country were directed purely and simply against a white minority government which unilaterally declared independence in 1965. Those reasons are no longer valid, Mr. Chairman. That government, which was anathema to the majority of our people, no longer exists. It has now been replaced by a government popularly elected by 64.8 per cent. of our electorate in elections which were conducted in an honest, impartial, democratic, free and fair manner. This was testified to by virtually all the observers sent to monitor our elections, including the team led by Lord Boyd which was sent by your party. You yourself, Mr. Chairman, indicated in the House of Lords on May 22 that the British Government would be guided by Lord Boyd's conclusions. I fear that in some measure you may have shifted your ground in this regard and, perhaps due to the pressures exerted on your Prime Minister in Lusaka, your commitment has not been followed through. I do most sincerely hope and trust that your government has no intention of accepting a situation where Zimbabwe Rhodesia becomes the sacrificial lamb on the altar of expediency.

I would now take you back to the 15th May of this year. At the opening of the present British Parliament your Prime Minister, Mrs.



Thatcher, said it was the objective of your government to build on the major change that had taken place in my country to achieve a return to legality in conditions of wide international recognition. Let me emphasize the word "major", which is of the greatest importance. This is exactly what has happened in Zimbabwe Rhodesia. There is a total new reality in our country. In Parliament, the House of Assembly consists of 72 black and 28 white members, the Senate consists of 20 black and 10 white senators. The Cabinet contains 19 ministers, of whom 14 are black and 5 are white. Prior to May the two highest posts in the land, that of Prime Minister and President, were held by whites. Now these posts are filled by blacks. Furthermore, as Minister of Combined Operations and Minister of Defence, I have executive control and ultimate authority over all military matters in my country. The military commanders operate under my immediate policy directives. Similarly, my black colleague, the Minister of Law and Order, who is a member of my delegation, holds executive power over the police.

All racially discriminatory laws, including those relating to land tenure, have been repealed—I repeat, have been repealed. People of all races are now permitted to live where they choose, whether in rural or urban residential areas. Our black population participates in all facets of business without any racial restrictions. Our schools and hospitals are now non-racial. All these significant developments were unheard of and thought impossible less than two years ago.

Mr. Chairman, you said yesterday that in the case of Rhodesia, as in all other cases, the constitution must take account of special circumstances. That is precisely what we have done. We have a new constitution drafted by both black and white members of the four parties to the March 3rd Agreement—it was drawn up by the people of our country to meet the needs of our country. We have a new flag, one that is symbolic of our country and all its people.

We have a new non-racial nation, one that is dedicating itself to be a good example to other countries, not only on the African continent but throughout the world. The successful conclusion of our agreement of the 3rd March, 1978, and the implementation of our new constitution, has been achieved through the tremendous courage displayed by the vast majority of our electorate during elections. They went to the polls happily and willingly to exercise their newly won democratic right to elect a government of their choice despite intimidation and threats of death. In doing so they clearly demonstrated their desire to determine the future course of their country and that this should be achieved through the ballot and not the bullet. The people voted because they had at last secured their inalienable right to do so, in spite of repeated threats by the Patriotic Front to disrupt our elections, to punish and

main our citizens who dared to vote and to execute the democratically elected black leaders of their government.

There are a number of most important matters on which we require a clear, binding and unequivocal undertaking from your government, Mr. Chairman, from the very outset of this Conference. I repeat that we have met the six principles. Lord Boyd reported on the last outstanding principle and your government has not denied his finding that the fifth principle has been met.

We require to know clearly and categorically what more your government requires from us before you will remove sanctions and grant recognition to our government. Thereafter, if we are able to reach agreement, we shall require a firm commitment in specific terms from your government that it is prepared to support our government to the fullest extent, that sanctions will be lifted, and that recognition will be granted. Here I must make it absolutely clear that we are not prepared to see any negation of what has so far been achieved in our country on behalf of our people, unless it is in their interests and in the interests of their country.

We require from Her Majesty's Government a guarantee, made publicly, to the effect that no one—I repeat, no one—will have the power of veto over the stated scope and focus of this Conference and that the same will apply to any decision that may be agreed.

Mr. Chairman, yesterday you asked us to set down fully our views on the constitutional questions and on the outline proposals published by the British Government when extending the invitation to this Conference. I have already dealt with the constitutional questions. As far as the outline proposals are concerned, the Constitutional Agreement of 3rd March, 1978, and our present constitution, substantially meet all the points that are made. We sincerely trust that you will not insist on us making changes to our constitution, which is already working very well, merely for the sake of appeasing other countries who do not appreciate the position in Zimbabwe Rhodesia. I repeat what you yourself said yesterday, Mr. Chairman: in the case of Zimbabwe Rhodesia, as in all other cases, the constitution must take account of special circumstances. The constitution of Zimbabwe Rhodesia was agreed in that country, and for that reason it is likely to stand the test of time. History has shown that many constitutions which have been agreed in this place have not lasted for any appreciable period. We do not want the same thing to happen to us.

The British Government, in its invitation to this Conference, strongly urged both sides to observe a cease-fire. Yesterday, Mr. Chairman, you said it was a matter of great regret and disappointment to you



that hostilities are continuing during this Conference. My delegation would like to have it placed on record that we accepted that appeal by the British Government and, in fact, we are still prepared to co-operate fully in trying to bring about a cease-fire. However, no cease-fire can be achieved unless all the parties to the conflict agree to observe this.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, in your address yesterday it was clear that you personally, and your government, earnestly desire to see this Conference succeed, and that you have the sincere determination to achieve this noble objective. You struck a chord which resounds in our own hearts when you deplored the terrible and useless loss of lives in our country. You challenged us in the name of humanity to adopt a constructive approach and contribute to the successful outcome of our deliberations.

I wish to assure you, Mr. Chairman, that I and my delegation are most willing, and indeed anxious, to respond to your challenge in the most positive manner. We shall do so in the true spirit of the Christian and democratic principles which we have always followed. We shall do so because deep in our consciences and our souls we believe that this will lead to the salvation of our people, our country and our nation. You will not find us lacking, Mr. Chairman, in our efforts to seek a realistic solution which will enable our country to progress to peace and prosperity. In God's name I pray that goodwill may prevail and that this Conference will be blessed with success.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

#### ANNEX C

#### SUMMARY OF THE INDEPENDENCE CONSTITUTION

The text is set out in Annexure I to the White Paper "Zimbabwe Rhodesia—Proposals for Independence"—Cmd. R.ZR. 18—1979—and is not reproduced in this Annex.

#### ANNEX D

#### THE PRE-INDEPENDENCE ARRANGEMENTS

The text is set out in Annexure II to the White Paper "Zimbabwe Rhodesia—Proposals for Independence"—Cmd. R.ZR. 18—1979—and is not reproduced in this Annex.



## RHODESIA: CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT

The parties to this cease-fire agreement have agreed as follows:

1. With effect from 2400 hours on 21st December, 1979, all movement by personnel of the Patriotic Front armed forces into Rhodesia and all cross-border military activity by the Rhodesian forces will cease. This agreement will take effect on a basis of strict reciprocity. The British Government will request the governments of countries bordering on Rhodesia to make arrangements to ensure that externally-based forces do not enter Rhodesia. Provision will be made to permit the return of civilian personnel to Rhodesia in order to vote or engage in other peaceful political activity. Border-crossing points will be established, under the supervision of the monitoring force, for this purpose.
2. With effect from 2400 hours on 28th December, 1979, all hostilities in Rhodesia will cease. The Commanders will issue instructions to the forces under their command to ensure that all contact between the respective forces is avoided. A Cease-fire Commission will be established in Salisbury. The Chairman of the Commission will be the Governor's Military Adviser. The Commission will consist of equal numbers of the representatives of the Military Commanders of both sides. The Commission will meet as required throughout the cease-fire. Its functions will include—
  - (a) ensuring compliance with agreed arrangements for the security and activities of the forces;
  - (b) the investigation of actual or threatened breaches of the cease-fire; and
  - (c) such other tasks as may be assigned to it by the Governor in the interests of maintaining the cease-fire.

The Commission will be independent of existing command structures and the Governor may at his discretion communicate direct with the Commanders of the Rhodesian forces and the Patriotic Front forces concerning the exercise of their respective functions. Any member of the Commission may invite it to discuss any question which appears to him to be relevant to its functions.

3. The British Government will be responsible for the establishment of a monitoring force under the command of the Governor's Military Adviser. This force will assess and monitor impartially all stages

of the inception and maintenance of the cease-fire by the forces and assist the Cease-fire Commission in its tasks. The Commanders of the Rhodesian forces and of the Patriotic Front forces undertake to co-operate fully with the monitoring force and to provide it with whatever facilities are necessary to assist it to discharge its functions.

4. Elements of the monitoring force will be assigned—
  - (a) to maintain contact with the command structures of the Rhodesian forces and Patriotic Front forces throughout Rhodesia;
  - (b) to monitor and observe the maintenance of the cease-fire by the respective forces; and
  - (c) to monitor agreed border-crossing points and the use made of them in accordance with such arrangements as may be agreed in the context of the cease-fire.
5. Members of the monitoring force will carry weapons for their personal protection only and will be provided with vehicles and aircraft carrying a distinctive marking. The force will be equipped with an independent radio communications network.
6. The parties recognize that disengagement of the forces will be essential to an effective cease-fire and the deployment of the monitoring force. At 2400 hours on 28th December, 1979, the Rhodesian armed forces, under the directions of the Governor, will therefore disengage to enable the Patriotic Front forces inside Rhodesia to begin the process of assembly. Elements of the monitoring force will be deployed to the command structure and bases of the Rhodesian forces and to assembly places and rendezvous positions designated for the Patriotic Front forces.
7. The Patriotic Front forces at present in Rhodesia will report with their arms and equipment to rendezvous positions (RPs) and will proceed thereafter to assembly places as indicated in the Appendix to this agreement. The process of assembly will take place under the direction of the Commanders of the Patriotic Front forces and under the auspices of the monitoring force.
8. Movement to assembly places will be completed by 2400 hours on 4th January, 1980. The process of assembly will take place with the assistance of the monitoring force. Arrangements will be made for the accommodation, security and other agreed requirements of the Patriotic Front forces.



9. The Rhodesian armed forces will comply with the directions of the Governor. There will be reciprocal disengagement by the Rhodesian forces, in relation to the successful accomplishment of the assembly process by the Patriotic Front forces.
10. With effect from cease-fire day, all forces will comply with the cease-fire and with the directions of the Governor. Any forces which fail to comply with the cease-fire or with the directions of the Governor will be deemed to be acting unlawfully.
11. The primary responsibility for dealing with breaches of the cease-fire will rest with the Commanders of the forces through the mechanism of the Cease-fire Commission and with the assistance of liaison officers of the monitoring force. The Commanders will ensure, with the assistance of the monitoring force, that breaches of the cease-fire are contained and dealt with. In the event of more general or sustained breaches of the cease-fire the Governor will decide what action to take to deal with them with the forces which have accepted his authority.
12. The parties undertake to issue clear and precise instructions to all units and personnel under their command to comply scrupulously with the arrangements for bringing the cease-fire into effect. They will make announcements, immediately following the conclusion of this agreement, which will be broadcast regularly through all appropriate channels to assist in ensuring that instructions to maintain the cease-fire reach all the forces under their command and are understood by the public in general.
13. The parties to this agreement renounce the use of force for political objectives. They undertake to accept the outcome of the elections, to comply with the directions of the Governor and to resolve peacefully any questions relating to the future composition of the armed forces, and the training and resettlement of military and civilian personnel.

Initialed at Lancaster House, London, this fifteenth day of December, 1979.

.....  
Lord Carrington

.....  
Mr. R. G. Mugabe

.....  
Bishop A. T. Muzorewa

.....  
Mr. J. M. Nkomo



Signed at Lancaster House, London, this twenty-first day of December, 1979.

.....  
Bishop A. T. Muzorewa

.....  
Mr. R. G. Mugabe

.....  
Dr. S. C. Mundawarara

.....  
M. J. M. Nkomo

Rhodesians Worldwide

# APPENDIX TO CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT

The following is a schedule (with grid references) of the assembly places and rendezvous positions referred to in paragraph 7 of the agreement.

Where no associated rendezvous positions are shown, Patriotic Front forces will make their way direct to the assembly place in question.

<i>Serial (a)</i>	<i>Assembly Place (b)</i>	<i>Associated Rendezvous Positions (c)</i>
A A1 A2	HOYA (US 1893)	BUKASSA STORE (TS 5383) MADOMBWE MISSION (TS 9525)
B B1	MAGADZE (US 6328)	MASEMIBURA SCHOOL (UR 1473)
C	MARYMOUNT (VS 3957)	
D D1	DENDERA (VS 7027)	MUCHINTIKI SCHOOL (UR 6663)
E	ELIM MISSION (VR 7654)	
F F1 F2 F3 F4	DZAPASI (UP 8050)	ST. MICHAEL'S SCHOOL (TQ 5546) MAHUZEKWA (UQ 0875) ST. ANNE'S (VQ 7728) ST. BARBARA'S SCHOOL (VQ 4555)
G G1 G2 G3	MUTANDAWHE (VM 1577)	PAMUSHANA MISSION (UN 4387) RUSITU MISSION (VN 8482) CHIKORE MISSION (VN 4640)

Rhodesians Worldwide



<i>Serial (a)</i>	<i>Assembly Place (b)</i>	<i>Associated Rendezvous Positions (c)</i>
H H1	MAKAMBE (UM 3320)	LOWER GWELQ (QJ 6455)
H2		HANKE MISSION (TP 0325)
H3		CHIBI (TN 4549)
J J1 J2	ZEZANI (QG 5808)	MTSHABEZI (PH 9609)
J3		MASASE, MISSION (QG 7779)
		CAPFUSE SCHOOL (TL 0961)
K	BRUNAPEG (PG 0659)	
L	MADHLAMBUDZI (NH 4570)	
M M1	ST. PAUL'S (PK 1716)	BETHESDA MISSION (LK 9398)
M2		LUBIMBI (NK 3357)
M3		JOMBE (QK 5331)
M4		KAMBO STORE (PK 7192)
N	SIABUWA (PL 1271)	
P P1 P2	RUKOMECHI (QN 5614)	MORORORO (QM 5132)
		SHAMROCK MINE (SS 8081)
Q	KARIYANGWE (NL 5613)	
R	MAGUREKURE SCHOOL (QL 8839)	

The disposition of the Rhodesian forces, under the Governor's authority, will be as set out in the Chairman's statement to the Conference on 11th December.

The Chairman's statement to the Conference on 11th December and the cease-fire arrangements agreed earlier by the parties are attached, together with the Chairman's concluding statement to the Conference on 15th December.



## RHODESIA: CEASE-FIRE NEGOTIATIONS

## STATEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN ON 11th DECEMBER, 1979

1. The substance of the British Government's proposals for a cease-fire has been set out in the Cease-fire Agreement circulated to the Conference. This is in accordance with the cease-fire proposals which have already been agreed. It remains to reach conclusions on matters of practical detail, so that the cease-fire can be implemented.

2. It has been agreed that the purpose of the cease-fire is to bring an immediate end to hostilities and to establish peaceful conditions which will allow elections to take place, the people of Rhodesia to choose their future government and Zimbabwe to become independent on the terms which have been agreed at this Conference. The British Government has accepted direct responsibility for the administration of Rhodesia during the pre-independence period, through the appointment of a Governor with executive and legislative powers. It will be the Governor's duty to administer the country so that free and fair elections can be held under his authority. It is essential therefore that the British Government should state the arrangements which it is prepared to make in connection with a cease-fire, as in connection with all the other matters concerning the pre-independence period on which it has made its position clear and on which all parties to the Conference are now agreed. Both sides have agreed to resolve their political differences through elections held under British authority on the basis of a democratic constitution which all have accepted. In these circumstances there can be no justification for any party to continue the war.

3. In further refining our cease-fire proposals I would like to make it clear from the outset that there can be no question of surrender by either side. All the forces which comply with the agreement, which accept the Governor's authority and comply with his directions will retain their arms and equipment, will be treated honourably, and will be lawful. Neither side will threaten the security of the other. A fully effective cease-fire, respected by all the forces, will foster an atmosphere of confidence in which the future Government will be able to resolve post-war military problems and decide the future of all the forces at its disposal.

4. It is impossible for any external authority or force to guarantee that a cease-fire will be effective. Only the parties themselves can ensure this. The purpose of the British Government's proposals is to help the forces to initiate and maintain a cease-fire through arrangements by

which they can be separated from their present inter-locked positions; infringements can be avoided so far as possible and contained where they have taken place; and there can be effective monitoring of each side's conduct. The task of a monitoring force is not and cannot be to compel either side to maintain a cease-fire, or in any sense to guard the forces of one side or the other. Its task is to observe and report on the manner in which the forces maintain the cease-fire agreement and thus give them an assurance that it will not be possible for any force to conduct activities in breach of the cease-fire in disregard of the Governor's instructions.

5. A conflict is at present taking place in which the armed forces of both sides are inter-locked over a wide area of the country. A substantial proportion of the armed forces of one side is also located in positions outside the country. It is necessary to establish the peaceful conditions for elections through an effective cease-fire and the separation of the forces. It follows that steps must be taken which will ensure as far as possible that during the pre-independence period—

- (a) there is a cessation of cross-border military activity by both sides;
- (b) the forces inside the country cease hostilities and are separated;
- (c) all forces which are prepared to cease-fire and to accept the Governor's authority are identified and comply with his directions; and
- (d) forces which do not accept the Governor's authority are unlawful.

6. The first step to be taken to secure these objectives is for the commanders of the forces on both sides in the conflict simultaneously and reciprocally to instruct their forces to desist from all cross-border movement and operations. Compliance with such instructions can be verified and the British Government has already called on the parties to the Conference to reach an agreement on this question without delay.

7. It is crucial to the achievement of a cease-fire within Rhodesia that the Commanders of the forces at present in the country should accept the authority of the Governor and be responsible to him for the maintenance of the cease-fire by all the forces under their command. It is only in this way that the leaders of the political parties and the people as a whole can be assured that the opposing forces have been brought under lawful authority.



8. In the circumstances prevailing in Rhodesia it will not be sufficient for the Governor to instruct the forces which have accepted his authority simply to cease-firing and remain in their present positions. A cease-fire in these circumstances would have no chance of being preserved and a monitoring force could not be deployed. Nor would any machinery exist through which disputes could be resolved. The British Government's proposals are designed to create the condition for an effective cease-fire by the establishment of such machinery and the disengagement of the forces.

#### *The Cease-fire Commission*

9. The British Government has proposed the establishment of a Cease-fire Commission on which the Commanders of the Rhodesian forces and of the Patriotic Front forces will be represented and which will meet under the chairmanship of the Governor's Military Adviser. The Commission will meet as often as necessary throughout the cease-fire. It will be established on cease-fire day and will remain in operation until independence day. It will provide a forum in which each side can seek assurance that the cease-fire agreement is being complied with. It will be able to call for reports on breaches of the cease-fire and discuss measures to contain them and to prevent their recurrence. Any member of the Commission will be able to raise any question which he believes to be relevant to the maintenance of the cease-fire. The Commission will not give directions to the forces on either side—that will be a matter for the Governor—but will be free to make recommendations to the Governor.

#### *The Monitoring Force*

10. The Cease-fire Commission will be assisted by a substantial monitoring force, under the command of the Governor's Military Adviser. The monitoring force will be under United Kingdom auspices, with the participation of contingents from Australia, New Zealand, Kenya and Fiji. I would like to pay tribute to the Governments' concern for their contribution to the process of bringing a settlement into effect. The force is on stand-by and can be deployed to Rhodesia within the next few days.

11. The force will number some 1 200 men. It will be equipped with its own vehicles, helicopters and C130 aircraft. It will have an independent and secure radio communications network. Members of the force will carry personal weapons for their own self-defence. Their uniforms, vehicles and aircraft will carry distinctive insignia which will make them easily recognizable by the forces and by the general public.

12. When fully deployed, the monitoring force will be in contact with the command structures of the Patriotic Front forces and the Rhodesian forces throughout the country. It will monitor and observe the

maintenance of the cease-fire by all the forces. It will also monitor border crossing points and the use made of them in accordance with the cease-fire agreement.

13. Senior officers of the monitoring force will be attached to each of the Joint Operations Command (JOCs) of the Rhodesian forces. Each of these officers will command a series of monitoring teams which will be attached to the sub-JOCs and company bases of the Rhodesian forces within each JOC's operational area.

14. This organization will be paralleled in relation to the Patriotic Front forces. A senior officer will be located with a representative of the Patriotic Front forces responsible for each group of assembly places allocated to the Patriotic Front. Under each such officer's command there will be a series of monitoring teams attached to the forces of the Patriotic Front in their places of assembly.

15. We have next had to consider the arrangements under which the forces will disengage and the monitoring force will be deployed. We cannot arrange for the simultaneous deployment of monitoring teams to both sides, because the Patriotic Front forces are diffused and will not, at the outset of the process, be identified to the monitoring force. The Rhodesian forces will make the first move by (a) accepting the Governor's authority and agreeing to comply with his directions; (b) the monitoring teams allocated to the Rhodesian forces will then be deployed through their command structure down to company base level; (c) on cease-fire day the Rhodesian forces will disengage from the Patriotic Front forces by moving into the close vicinity of bases to permit the Patriotic Front to assemble their forces.

16. It will then be for the Patriotic Front to assemble their forces via rendezvous points to assembly places at which they can be monitored. The process of assembly will be continuous. For this purpose, it will be necessary for the Patriotic Front, under the auspices of the monitoring force, to send representatives to each of the rendezvous points. The Patriotic Front forces will make their way with their arms and equipment to the rendezvous points, where they will be under the authority of their own Commanders. From there they will move to their assembly places in transport which will be provided for them, with their arms and equipment and under their own command. This movement will take place under the auspices of the monitoring force, who will be in direct communication with the teams attached to the Rhodesian forces so that each side can be informed of the other's movements and there can be no misunderstanding of each other's intentions.



17. Monitoring teams will also be established from the outset at the assembly places themselves and will meet the Patriotic Front forces as they arrive. In their assembly places the Patriotic Front forces will retain their arms and equipment and will remain under their own commanders. They will be responsible for the organization and discipline of their forces.

18. The Patriotic Front delegation have expressed concern about the ability of their commanders to transmit cease-fire orders to their men in the field. But the British Government stands ready, in conjunction with the monitoring force, to arrange whatever facilities the Patriotic Front commanders require to ensure that their orders reach their men in the field. We are prepared to help with this in terms of broadcasting and other radio facilities, transport, etc.

19. By the time the assembly process is complete we shall have reached a point at which the forces which have accepted the Governor's authority are known and identified; the opposing forces have been separated from each other; and monitoring teams are located with the forces of both sides so that their maintenance of the cease-fire can be observed. If any force does not comply with the cease-fire agreement and with the Governor's directions it will be acting unlawfully. The commanders on both sides will be answerable to the Governor for the maintenance of the cease-fire by their respective forces. If there are breaches of the cease-fire, it will be for the Commanders to deal with these, through the machinery of the Cease-fire Commission and with the assistance of the monitoring force. If there are repeated and sustained breaches of the cease-fire, the Governor will have to decide what action to take to deal with these with the forces which have accepted his authority.

20. Our proposals are designed to bring about reciprocal disengagement. The Rhodesian forces will be monitored to the level of their sub-JOCs and company bases from the first day of the cease-fire. These arrangements will apply to the Patriotic Front once they have identified and assembled their forces at places from which they too can be monitored and be in contact with the Cease-fire Commission. It is in their interests that they should do so to enable the arrangements for their security, accommodation and other agreed requirements to be adequately provided for.

21. The assembly places allocated to the Patriotic Front have been chosen in relation to their operational areas and to the requirement that they must not be in close proximity to Rhodesian bases. They

must contain certain indispensable facilities, including road access and an airstrip for the re-supply of the Patriotic Front forces and the monitoring teams. We have made a selection of assembly places which meet these criteria, particularly the question of the security of the Patriotic Front forces, about which the Patriotic Front delegation have expressed concern. I would like to make it quite clear that the British Government cannot accept that Patriotic Front forces which assemble under the auspices of the monitoring force and which accept the Governor's authority and comply with his directions will be in any danger of attack from other forces. There could, in these circumstances, be no danger to their security. I am conscious of the concern expressed by the Patriotic Front that their assembly places should not be in close proximity to Rhodesian bases and that they should not be "encircled". There has never been any question of the Patriotic Front forces being encircled. They will be under the authority of their own commanders; and other forces will not be in close proximity to them.

22. Our intention is to circulate to the Conference later today maps prepared by our military experts which will show where the monitoring force will be located in relation to the forces both during the process of assembly and after it has been completed. In doing this, we have taken account of the information which the delegations have given us about their force levels. The Salisbury delegation have declared to us their force levels. These will be rendered public as soon as the Patriotic Front have put forward their own force levels. The Rhodesian force levels include all the forces mentioned by the Patriotic Front leaders, including the guard force and auxiliaries. These force levels correspond to our own independent estimates, and we believe them to be realistic.

23. In the absence of any information from the Patriotic Front about their force levels inside Rhodesia, we have been obliged to proceed on the basis of our own independent estimates of those force levels. These estimates reveal an important disparity in numbers between the size of the Rhodesian forces and of the Patriotic Front forces. The arrangements we are proposing for disengagement have to take account of this disparity in numbers as well as of other factors, including the need to make use of logistic and other facilities. We have therefore proposed that the Patriotic Front forces should report to rendezvous points which are spread throughout the country and which are in close proximity to all their forces; and that they should then assemble in places which are situated in their operational areas; which are not in close proximity to Rhodesian bases and which are in locations which take account of the need to enable the Patriotic Front personnel assembled in them to feel secure. We have similarly proposed that the Rhodesian forces should be monitored down to the level of their company bases.



## RHODESIA: CEASE-FIRE ARRANGEMENTS

24. I cannot stress too strongly the importance of our having accurate knowledge of the respective force levels. Both the other delegations at this Conference have expressed concern that the other side may have forces inside Rhodesia or may bring forces into Rhodesia which will not be monitored and will not comply with the cease-fire. We have proposed comprehensive arrangements for the monitoring of the Rhodesian forces from cease-fire day. It will not be possible to make similar arrangements for the Patriotic Front forces unless and until they assemble their forces and give us firm assurances that they will not move forces outside the country into Rhodesia.

25. The Patriotic Front delegation have asked on several occasions in this Conference about the dispositions of the Rhodesian forces. The maps which we shall be circulating this afternoon will show that, given the balance of the forces at present inside the country, the monitoring force will be deployed to the forces on both sides in proportions which are related to their respective strengths. The Rhodesian forces will, as I have already said, have disengaged to the close vicinity of their bases to allow the Patriotic Front forces to assemble. What happens in the next phase will depend crucially on what happens in the assembly phase. If Patriotic Front forces remain in the field or continue to be introduced from outside the country, those forces will be unlawful. If, however, all Patriotic Front forces inside Rhodesia assemble with their arms and there is no further movement by externally-based Patriotic Front forces into Rhodesia, there would be no need in those circumstances for the Governor to ask the Rhodesian forces to deploy from their company bases.

26. Finally, I am conscious of the concern on both sides about the situation which might arise after the elections. I have made it clear that if this is the general wish the monitoring force would stay in Rhodesia until the independence government is formed and independence is granted; and would try to help in overcoming any problems which might arise in this period. It will be for the independence government to request whatever assistance it requires in the future training or re-settlement of the forces.

27. Once our maps have been distributed to the delegations this afternoon, we shall have given the Conference the fullest possible exposition of our plans. This is therefore the full presentation of the British Government's cease-fire proposals. The monitoring force is standing by and is ready to go to Rhodesia in the next few days. I have no doubt that, on this basis, it will be possible to bring a cease-fire into effect and to begin the assembly process within the next few days. I hope that when you have studied these papers, this document and the maps, you will be able to give us your earliest possible response.

1. The British Government puts forward the following amplified proposals for the establishment and maintenance of a comprehensive monitored cease-fire agreement.

*Basis of the cease-fire*

2. The purpose of the cease-fire is to being an immediate end to hostilities and to establish peaceful conditions which will allow elections to take place, the people of Zimbabwe to choose their future government and Zimbabwe to become independent on the terms which have been agreed at this Conference. Given a commitment by all the parties to abide by the results of the elections, it will also provide a basis on which post-war military problems can be resolved by agreement and a lasting peace can be established.

*Responsibility for the cease-fire*

3. The Commanders of the forces involved will be directly responsible to the Governor for the maintenance of the cease-fire by all the forces under their command.

4. The Governor will be assisted by a British Military Adviser of the rank of Major-General. The Rhodesian security forces and the Patriotic Front will nominate equal numbers of military representatives to a Cease-fire Commission which will be established in Salisbury from the beginning of the cease-fire. The Chairman of the Commission will be the Governor's Military Adviser. The Commission will meet as required throughout the cease-fire. Its functions will include—

- (a) ensuring compliance with agreed arrangements for the security and activities of the forces;
- (b) the investigation of actual or threatened breaches of the cease-fire; and
- (c) such other tasks as may be assigned to it by the Governor in the interests of maintaining the cease-fire.

The Commission will be independent of existing command structures and the Governor may at his discretion communicate with any commander concerning the exercise of their functions. Any member of the Commission may invite it to discuss any question which appears to him to be relevant to its functions.



### *Monitoring the cease-fire*

5. The British Government will be responsible for the establishment of a monitoring force which will assess and monitor impartially all stages of the inception and maintenance of the cease-fire by the forces and assist the Cease-fire Commission in its tasks. The organisation will operate under the authority of the Governor and the command of his Military Adviser. The Commanders of the Rhodesian security forces and of the Patriotic Front forces will be required to undertake to co-operate fully with the monitoring force and to provide it with whatever facilities are necessary to assist it to discharge its functions.

6. Elements of the monitoring force will be assigned—

- (a) to maintain contact with the Rhodesian security forces and Patriotic Front forces command structures throughout Rhodesia;
- (b) to monitor and observe the maintenance of the cease-fire by the respective forces; and
- (c) to monitor agreed border-crossing points and the use made of them in accordance with such arrangements as may be agreed in the context of the cease-fire.

7. For this purpose liaison and monitoring teams will be established as follows—

- (a) five liaison teams, each led by a senior officer (i.e. of the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel) will be assigned to maintain contact with each of the security forces Joint Operations Commands (JOCs);
- (b) a number of teams of equivalent rank will be assigned to maintain contact with the Patriotic Front forces command structure;
- (c) fifteen teams, each led by a junior officer (i.e. Captain or Lieutenant) will be located with the security forces at sub-JOC level;
- (d) a number of teams led by a Lieutenant or Senior NCO will be located at security forces company base level;
- (e) up to fifteen teams, each led by an officer, will be located at places designated for assembly of Patriotic Front forces;
- (f) up to twelve teams, each led by an officer, will be located at border crossing points; and

(g) two teams, each commanded by an officer of the rank of Flight Lieutenant or Squadron Leader, will be located at military airfields.

8. The force will be organised under British auspices; and the majority of its personnel will be British. The Australian, New Zealand, Kenyan and Fijian governments have agreed to participate in the monitoring force. Members of the force will carry weapons for their personal protection only and will be provided with vehicles and helicopters carrying a distinctive marking. The force will be equipped with an independent radio communications network.

### *Dispositions of the Forces*

9. Disengagement of the forces will be essential to an effective cease-fire and the deployment of the monitoring force. The activities of the security forces and their maintenance of the cease-fire will be monitored from their existing bases. In the case of the Patriotic Front forces at present inside Rhodesia, it will be essential that they should assemble at pre-determined places so that their maintenance of the cease-fire can be similarly monitored and arrangements can be made for their security, accommodation and other agreed requirements.

10. Up to fifteen such places will be designated for this purpose. In addition, a larger number of intermediate collection points will be designated to which Patriotic Front personnel will report with their arms and equipment during the initial phase of the cease-fire and from which they will make their way by agreed safe-routes to their assembly places. A Patriotic Front representative and a monitoring team will be present at each intermediate collection point during this phase. The police and defence forces will not be involved in the assembly process and will not be present at the collection points. Patriotic Front personnel will be guaranteed safe passage from the collection points to their assembly places.

### *Cross-border activity*

11. A major objective of the cease-fire arrangements must be to secure a cessation of all movement by the security forces into neighbouring countries and by the Patriotic Front forces into Rhodesia. The Governor will be responsible for ensuring compliance with this requirement by the forces inside Rhodesia. The governments of Zambia, Botswana and Mozambique will be invited to agree on effective cross-border liaison arrangements to ensure compliance with this requirement for forces based outside Rhodesia and to prevent cross-border movements by such forces. This will involve the establishment of liaison officers outside Rhodesia. At the same time, provision must be made to permit the return



of civilian personnel to Rhodesia during the cease-fire in order to vote or engage in other peaceful political activity. Up to twelve border crossing points will be established, under the supervision of the monitoring force, for this purpose.

#### *The time scale*

12. A fully effective cease-fire cannot come into operation immediately. Time will be required for the transmission of orders to subordinate commanders in the field and for the implementation of the agreed arrangements for the separation of the opposing forces. But it is essential that the cease-fire should be brought into operation quickly if it is to be effective. It is therefore proposed that as soon as agreement has been reached on the cease-fire:—

- (a) all parties should issue instructions forthwith for its implementation on a given date. All cross-border military activity will cease. Elements of the monitoring force will be despatched to Rhodesia;
- (b) on cease-fire day the Cease-fire Commission will be established. The monitoring force will deploy to the collection points and assembly places for the Patriotic Front forces. All hostilities within Rhodesia will cease. The process of assembly of the forces will begin immediately and should take not more than seven days. The completion of the deployment of the monitoring force will have taken place by then.

13. During the cease-fire the responsibility for the maintenance of law and order will rest with the police, acting under the Governor's authority and supervision. All forces which have assembled and accepted the Governor's authority and continue to comply with his directions will be acting lawfully. Any forces which fail to assemble, and fail to accept the Governor's authority and abide by the cease-fire agreement, will be acting unlawfully. The primary responsibility for dealing with breaches of the cease-fire will rest with the Commanders on both sides, through the mechanism of the Cease-fire Commission and with the assistance of the liaison teams operating with the forces at area level. It will be for the Commanders to ensure, with the assistance of the monitoring force, that breaches of the cease-fire are contained and dealt with. In the event of more general or sustained breaches of the cease-fire, the Governor will have to decide what action to take to deal with them with the forces which have accepted his authority.

#### *Instructions to Military Personnel*

14. The leaders on each side will ensure that clear and precise instructions are issued to all units and personnel under their command to comply scrupulously with the agreed arrangements for bringing the cease-fire into effect. The leaders of the delegations at the Conference will make announcements, immediately following the conclusion of the cease-fire agreement, which will be broadcast regularly through all appropriate channels to assist in ensuring that instructions to maintain the cease-fire reach all the forces under their command and are understood by the public in general.

#### *The Longer Term*

15. An effective cease-fire during the pre-independence period, a peaceful election campaign and an election the result of which is accepted and respected by all parties will bring about a permanent end to the war. Many of those at present under arms will wish to return to civilian life. Others will wish to continue to pursue a military career. Decisions on post-war military planning will be a matter for the government which will be constituted following the elections and under which Zimbabwe will become independent. The British Government will be ready to assist with the re-training and re-settlement of those elements of the forces which wish to pursue a civil career.

22nd November, 1979.



RHODESIA: CEASE-FIRE NEGOTIATIONS

STATEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN ON 15th DECEMBER, 1979

1. I would like to open this session by reminding delegations of the achievements of this Conference; and achievements there have been. Agreement has been reached on an Independence Constitution providing for genuine majority rule and thereby removing the fundamental cause of the war. That was what it was about. Bishop Muzorewa and his colleagues agreed to hand over authority to a British Governor who is now in Salisbury. The Governor's task is to organise elections in which all parties can participate freely. Agreement has also been reached on our cease-fire proposals. We have now set out their detailed implementation.

2. In order to meet various concerns expressed by the Patriotic Front and to explain our basic proposals, I made a statement on 28th November which was designed to help the Patriotic Front to agree to the cease-fire proposals; and I am very glad that this helped them to do so. In order to meet further concerns expressed by the Patriotic Front and to explain fully our detailed proposals, I made a full statement on 11th December and circulated maps to the other delegations to the Conference. My statement of 11th December is incorporated in the final Conference documents.

3. The Patriotic Front have expressed concern about the number of assembly places allocated to them in relation to the size of their forces. Equally strongly felt anxieties have been expressed by the Salisbury delegation as to whether there will be an effective assembly and a cessation of cross-border movement. I can assure the Patriotic Front, however, that if the Patriotic Front forces at present in Rhodesia assemble with their arms and equipment in numbers greater than can be dealt with at the assembly places designated in the cease-fire agreement, the Governor will assess the need for additional sites in relation to the successful accomplishment of the assembly process by the Patriotic Front forces and in relation to the dispositions of their forces.

4. This Conference has now been in session for fourteen weeks. All the issues have been exhaustively discussed. With agreement on the Independence Constitution, a return to legality and free elections in which all parties can participate there can be no reason for anyone to continue the war. The whole purpose of our proposals is to offer everyone an alternative to continuing the war. We cannot oblige any party to accept that alternative; but we do not believe that others will readily under-

stand a decision by any party to continue the war against a lawful authority established to enable elections to be held in which all parties can participate. It will be a matter of very grave disappointment to everybody if it is not possible to reach overall agreement at the Conference after all we have achieved.

5. I hope that both delegations will be able to agree to the documents we circulated to the Conference on 13th December and to agree to initial them. Signature could then follow very quickly indeed. A cease-fire will then come into effect bringing peace to the people of Rhodesia and the neighbouring countries.

6. I cannot emphasise too strongly that it is my profound conviction that to deny the people of Rhodesia this opportunity to resolve their problems by peaceful means would be unforgivable. Immense benefits would flow from the signature of these agreements for them and for the people of the other countries who have suffered so much from the war. In other words a peaceful settlement is now, after 14 weeks today, within your grasp.

7. I cannot oblige anyone to take the decisions necessary to enable such a settlement to be put into effect. But I hope that everyone will reflect very seriously on the consequences and the responsibility for a failure to agree to a cease-fire, the essential purpose of which is to enable all the parties to campaign freely throughout the country in elections held under our authority. I ask therefore whether the other delegations are prepared to initial the documents.

As Chairman of the Lancaster House Conference I would like to make a few concluding remarks.

With the signature of this final report we complete together fourteen weeks of concerted and concentrated effort. I would like to take this opportunity to congratulate all the participants in this Conference, and in particular the leaders of the delegations who sit beside me, on the successful outcome of our endeavours. The documents that we have just signed are of the greatest significance to the people of Rhodesia and of the neighbouring states.

In opening this Conference I expressed the hope that we would be able to lay the foundations for a free, independent and democratic society in which all the people of Rhodesia irrespective of their race or political beliefs would be able to live in security and at peace with each other and with their neighbours. That hope has now been realised. The people of Rhodesia will now be able to settle their future by peaceful means.



As Lord Soames said on his arrival in Salisbury last week, for a war weary country the prize is great.

What is that prize It is the end of war and enmity. It is the opportunity for all Rhodesians to devote their energies to peaceful activities. It is a chance for the country to renew and strengthen its relations with its neighbours and with the wider international community. It is, in brief, the opportunity for a more normal and settled existence. That is what I believe the people of Rhodesia sought from this Conference.

In signing these documents today we have together pledged ourselves to certain solemn undertakings.

For our part, the British Government intend faithfully to discharge the heavy responsibilities we have undertaken during the period leading to elections and the transfer of sovereignty to the new government of Zimbabwe. We have already taken the legislative action which is necessary to bring your country to legal independence following the holding of elections.

We have no wish to prolong our role. Our task is to give the people of your country the chance to decide for themselves their own future and to establish a new relationship between Rhodesia and the rest of the world.

I am glad to say that this process has already started, so that you will be able to take your rightful place in the international community.

The British Government is prepared to help Rhodesia to overcome the difficulties of the past: to carry out its responsibilities; and to do its utmost to offer you the prospect of a more peaceful future. The rest depends on your cooperation.

It is essential to the success of the enterprise on which we are now engaged that all the parties should realise that what have been signed at the conclusion of this Conference are solemn and binding agreements. It will be for the Governor to see that the parties act in accordance with these commitments.

For the people of Rhodesia and of the neighbouring states, today's signature heralds the end of a war which has caused immense suffering and hardship. From midnight tonight the first phase of the ceasefire will come into operation.

The parties have pledged to cease any cross-border movement by their forces. It is essential to the preservation of the cease-fire that this agreement should be complied with.

The moment, however, for which the people of Rhodesia have been waiting will come at midnight on Friday, 28th December. At that time all hostilities within Rhodesia must cease and dis-engagement and assembly will begin. This will be a difficult period. It is essential that the forces on both sides should comply scrupulously, under the direction of their commanders, with the requirements of the cease-fire agreement.

This provides that the forces must dis-engage, must move rapidly to the nearest rendezvous point, and must thereafter move on to the assembly places designated in the cease-fire agreement. The successful accomplishment of the dis-engagement and assembly process will be of crucial importance to the future effectiveness of the cease-fire.

The subsequent commitments concerning the observance of the cease-fire and the pursuit of the political campaign by peaceful means are of no less importance. The Governor could not undertake the task without the powers and authority which are necessary to enable him to accomplish it. These include the power to take whatever action is necessary to ensure compliance with the agreements entered into today.

Our commitment is to fair elections. Having committed themselves to campaign peacefully and to comply with the cease-fire agreement, no party or group could expect to take part in elections if it continued the war or systematically to break the cease-fire and to practise widespread intimidation.

I make no apology for emphasising the importance of our commitments in the period ahead.

I have done so because I feel strongly the sense of hope which goes with having achieved so much: for in accepting them, you have given the people of Rhodesia and of the neighbouring countries new hope for the future.

The British Government has sought to create the conditions in which you can settle your differences by peaceful means. The agreements which you have signed give you the opportunity to do so: and will create among the people of Rhodesia the hope that at the end of a bitter conflict lies prospect of national reconciliation.

We have a shared responsibility now to do our utmost to ensure that Zimbabwe comes to independence in conditions of peace.

With your co-operation and that of the neighbouring countries, we can hope to achieve that objective.

We stand at the end of a difficult decade in the history of Southern Africa. With the conclusion today of the agreement the prospects are immeasurably improved.



But the significance of today's signature goes far wider than that. The progress of this Conference has been watched with keen attention from many countries. If, as a result of a negotiated settlement, wounds so deep can be healed in Rhodesia — as I pray that they shall be during the months ahead — then the people of that country will have set an example and given hope to others throughout the world.

In particular, they will have given new heart to those who have been patiently working for a peaceful settlement in Namibia. And they will have encouraged those who wish to resolve the issues which now divide South Africa from the other countries of the continent.

We have succeeded — not always very easily — in maintaining over weeks the spirit of compromise and determination that was born at the Lusaka Conference. We have done so with the help and support of other Commonwealth countries, and of much of Africa.

As I formally bring the Constitutional Conference to a close, therefore, I would thank both delegations for reminding the world, at a time when it is very much in need of it, that there is a genuine alternative to conflict. You have earned our deep and sincere gratitude. In the testing days ahead we shall give you all possible support in developing a spirit of reconciliation throughout Zimbabwe and Southern Africa, and in ensuring that the next decade will be one of peace and prosperity.



# Rhodesians Worldwide

---

*Printed by the Government Printer*

Rhodesians Worldwide