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TEN QUESTIONS  
ON THE  
Rhodesians Worldwide  
RHODESIAN SETTLEMENT

JULY, 1978

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Q.1. What is the attitude of the whites and blacks to the settlement?

A.1. Naturally, the compromise signed in Salisbury on 3 March, 1978, is not acceptable either to the right-wing Rhodesia Action Party or to the extremist followers of Nkomo and Mugabe. It is agreed by all impartial observers, however, that these forces are very much in the minority.

The same observers estimate that the signatories to the Agreement, Mr. Jan Smith, Chief Chirau, Rev. Sithole and Bishop Muzorewa together represent over 80 per cent. of the population of all races, whose attitude towards the settlement could best be described as cautious optimism based on a full realization of the difficulties to be faced as well as hope of a successful outcome. Sample reactions of the population as reported in *The Rhodesia Herald*:

Mr. James Mapango: "I feel it is a good thing as long as it means a good future for people."

Mr. I. R. Machekanyanga: "The whole exercise as such is not bad if it is being undertaken wholeheartedly by the whites."

Mrs. Lorna Wilson: "As a Rhodesian, I hope the settlement is a good one. There are three generations of us Rhodesians and the country is ours as much as it is the blacks. Yes, I am happy, but it's terrorism we have to worry about now. Otherwise, I think this country could be unique — if we all work together."

Mr. N. P. Norton (a businessman): "I'll give it to you in five words. I just hope it succeeds."

Though it is difficult to ascertain the views of the tribesmen living in rural areas affected by "Patriotic Front" terrorism, it is most probable that the population will secretly welcome any agreement which seeks to remove the causes of the war. This is borne out by an assessment of opinion in the rural areas carried out by local Reuter's correspondent Rodney Pinder who spent a week flying around Rhodesia interviewing farmers, missionaries, teachers, and tribesmen. Pinder in his report published externally and in *The Rhodesia Herald* of 17 March, 1978,

stated that he found 60 per cent. of those interviewed supported the Agreement, 13 per cent. opposed it, 17 per cent. were undecided and the remaining 10 per cent. refused to answer questions.

Q.2. Why does the Salisbury Agreement contain safeguards for the white minority?

A.2. There has long been a world-wide reluctance to concede that the unique social, economic and political composition of Rhodesia should be reflected in any unique system of government under black majority rule. Paradoxically, however, it is widely recognized that white confidence, necessary for the retention of essential skills and expertise, must be maintained if Rhodesia is to avoid the economic and social decline of many African countries after independence.

The Anglo-American negotiators, in particular, seek to reassure the minority races in Rhodesia, but continue to denounce any Agreement which guarantees their future through constitutional arrangements unacceptable to African radicals and black racialists.

The Salisbury settlement, by which 28 per cent. of the seats in the new Parliament will be reserved for minorities for the period of ten years, shows that the need for compromise is clearly understood by those black leaders prepared to abide by the results of free and fair elections. For their part, white leaders have emphasised that their constitutional privileges will not be used to frustrate the will of the incoming black government.

Q.3. Is the settlement a "sell-out"? Who denounces the settlement, and why?

A.3. As a practical compromise between the black majority and white minority, the Agreement proposes that Rhodesia will have majority rule and self-determination by 31 December, 1978, thereby fulfilling the conditions laid down by international opinion as the only basis for legal recognition. While the actual terms, especially those concerning guarantees for minority rights, are not the legitimate concern of external parties, it is important to note the torrent of abuse poured down on the heads of the signatories.

Though they constantly assure the Western public of their "democratic" intentions, the Communist-backed "Patriotic Front", led by Nkomo and Mugabe has fulminated against the Agreement which will produce the very majority rule in whose name their terrorist forces commit all sorts of atrocities against black and white civilians. Their accusations that the settlement is a "sham", that the black signatories are "puppets" etc., have naturally been amplified by the international Left, who are determined to sabotage any pro-Western new dispensation in Rhodesia.

It is more surprising to note the same criticisms being repeated by democratic Western Governments, who point out that the apparatus of "white" power still functions, a strange objection coming from those who have called for an orderly transition to ensure the stability of the future black government.

The real motive behind these attempts to discredit the settlement will be discussed in answering further questions.

Q.4. Are Nkomo and Mugabe excluded?

A.4. Given the frequently raised objection by the Western powers to the settlement on the grounds that the "Patriotic Front" terrorists have allegedly been excluded, it is important to establish the facts. *Time and time again, the signatories of the Salisbury Agreement have invited Nkomo and Mugabe to participate, subject only to the perfectly justified requirement that these men renounce violence and agree to work constitutionally.*

As Mr. Smith told the BBC on 15 June, 1978, "We have made an offer inviting Messrs. Nkomo and Mugabe to come in and participate in our agreement on an equal footing with the rest of us". This offer has been rejected in the most vitriolic terms, Mr. Nkomo claiming (18 June, 1978) that "the agreement entrenches minority rule, entrenches racism" and Mr. Mugabe declaring (30 April, 1978) that "if we find Smith alive when we take power, he will be tried by a people's court and will be shot".



Since both wings of the "Patriotic Front" have stepped up their military operations since the signing of the Salisbury Agreement, it is clear that *Nkomo and Mugabe have chosen to exclude themselves from the settlement.*

**Q.5. Will the Salisbury Agreement bring peace?**

A.5. It is frequently claimed by the Anglo-American negotiators that the "internal" settlement is a recipe for civil war. The fact is, however, that there is already a civil war in Rhodesia between a coalition of black and white moderates on one hand and the "Patriotic Front" coalition on the other. By providing for the first aspirations of all Rhodesians, the settlement gives the lie to claims that continuing terrorism by Nkomo and Mugabe, backed by the Soviets and Cubans, is a "war of liberation". Whether or not the Transitional Government succeeds in persuading followers of two men clearly shown to be motivated by personal ambition that they no longer have any reason to continue the struggle will largely depend on the momentum of change in terms of the Salisbury Agreement, a factor in which the attitude and actions of the Western World will be important.

Western support for the settlement will only be forthcoming if—

- (a) It is shown that the existing multi-racial Security Forces (80 per cent. are black) are willing and able to keep the "Patriotic Front" at bay and that erstwhile supporters of Nkomo and Mugabe are being attracted to a peaceful solution.
- (b) Elections prove that the settlement has the support of the majority of the blacks.

*The priority for the "Patriotic Front" is therefore to prevent elections being held.* Nkomo, for instance, declared in Lusaka on 17 February, 1978, that "Never shall these elections be realized. Election stations are a military target because they are against the interests of the people". Similar statements reaffirming the "Patriotic Front's" desire to continue the struggle against their *black* rivals have been made by Mugabe.

It is unquestionably the greatest desire of nearly all Rhodesians for peace and a return to normality so that stability and a sound future for all can be guaranteed under majority rule. It is certain that the Anglo-American desire to "solve" the Rhodesian problem by according power over security matters to the "Patriotic Front" during any Western-supported transition would in fact produce the flight of the whites, the violent "settling of scores" against moderate blacks and later an inevitable armed conflict between the Matabele supporters of Nkomo and the Shona army of Mugabe, the price of such a short-lived "peace" and international recognition is too high.

It follows that the prospects for any sort of "peace conference" are not encouraging. There are good grounds to hope, however, that the settlement will gradually erode support for the "Patriotic Front" whose remaining "hard-liners" will increasingly be seen by the African masses not as "freedom fighters" but ambitious gangsters. If the West supports the Transitional Government now, the war is likely to die away. If however the West continues to provide diplomatic support (and material assistance) to the "Patriotic Front", the chances of a major blood-bath in Rhodesia will be immeasurably increased.

**Q.6. What is behind Soviet and Cuban support for the "Patriotic Front"?**

A.6. The Soviet Union has always aimed at world domination. Southern Africa, strategically placed to command maritime communications between East and West, also is a major source of raw materials, notably minerals, vital to the economies of the capitalist countries. It follows that the Kremlin has consistently supported revolutionary movements in the region. Encouraged by the ineffectual Western response to their encroachment in Angola and Mozambique, the Soviets are striving for further victories through the "Patriotic Front" in Rhodesia and SWAPO in South West Africa — before launching the main attack on South Africa. It follows that the international Left, making every attempt to sabotage harmony and racial understanding, is being orchestrated against the Rhodesian settlement by Moscow.

**Q.7. What is the policy of the Carter Administration?**

A.7. Although there are signs of internal conflict within the present American Government over Africa policy, it is clear that—

- (a) The United States is determined to avoid any commitment of American troops in Africa, even in support of long-standing friends of the West. In the aftermath of Vietnam, American public opinion is strongly opposed to "foreign adventures" and reluctant to risk any confrontation with the Communist powers.
- (b) The United States is determined to develop its economic links with black Africa, especially oil-exporting Nigeria. *The welfare of the people of Rhodesia is not nearly as important in American eyes as the goodwill of the Nigerian dictator and other black radicals.*
- (c) American policy is deeply influenced by the electoral need to convince the black American that the President is "committed" to the "liberation" of Africa, regardless of the obvious ignorance of African realities displayed by Andrew Young and other U.S. Administration officials.
- (d) President Carter, a notable exponent of democracy and "human rights" therefore finds himself in the invidious position of having to oppose the Rhodesian settlement, fundamentally because the Salisbury Agreement is not popular with certain politicians elsewhere in Africa and because the Soviet-Cuban proteges, Nkomo and Mugabe, will not accept a peaceful solution likely to favour their rivals through the ballot box.
- (e) American diplomacy, therefore, seeks to discredit the settlement, emphasizing the threat of Soviet-Cuban intervention and casting aspersions on the "genuineness" of the majority rule which will result from the Agreement. Simultaneously, U.S. spokesmen, echoed by their British counterparts, strive to portray Nkomo and Mugabe as "Christian non-racialist" rather than as clients of Moscow.

It follows that the basic intention of Washington at the present time is to obstruct any settlement which will not satisfy the "Patriotic Front" and its radical backers, give a dominant role in the new "Zimbabwe" to Nkomo and Mugabe, and then seek to outbid the Communists and woo the new rulers to the Western side, mainly through lavish financial aid.

**Q.8. What is the real purpose of the Anglo-American Proposals?**

A.8. The key points of the Anglo-American proposals are that the white and black moderates are required to surrender unconditionally to a temporary British administration supported by the United Nations. At the same time, effective control of the Army, Police and security administrations is to be entrusted to the "Patriotic Front" military forces before the holding of elections leading to the formation of a new majority-rule government, the withdrawal of the British and international recognition of Rhodesia's independence, the lifting of sanctions, etc.

From the answer to question 7, it is clear that the Anglo-American proposals, shorn of diplomatic verbiage, are not designed to give priority to the welfare and wishes of the people of Rhodesia of all races, but form part of an over-all diplomatic strategy which seeks to avoid confrontation with the Soviets, preferring a policy of competition for the favour of radical blacks in the "Patriotic Front", the "front-line" states and the rest of Africa.

*It is important to note that Britain and America reneged on their part of the Kissinger agreement with Mr. Smith (24 September, 1976) by which the Rhodesia Government would bring about majority rule in return for substantial support from the West. The Rhodesian settlement now under way in fact amounts to a unilateral implementation of the package deal by Mr. Smith and his black partners. If the Anglo-Americans were unwilling or unable to resist black extremist pressure at the time of the Kissinger agreement, and now continue to oppose a settlement ensuring an orderly transition to black majority rule, the gravest doubts as to the impartiality and resolution of any British or American*



temporary administration in Rhodesia during a difficult transition period must arise. London and Washington have done nothing to prove good faith with the majority of black and whites who repudiate violence and extremism.

Q.9. What are the implications of the Rhodesian settlement for the rest of Africa?

A.9. Virtually all black-ruled states in Africa are actually or potentially unstable for a number of social, economic and political reasons. Events in Angola, the Horn of Africa and now the Shaba province of Zaire have shown the vulnerability of the continent as a whole to the enterprises of even small bodies of efficient fighting men, particularly when these are either Communist trained and supplied, or even foreign, i.e. Cuban expeditionary forces. Black Africa governments, despite their frequent calls for non-alignment are therefore particularly sensitive to the effective balance of power between East and West. Recent events in Africa have shaken the confidence of moderate blacks in the reliability of the United States as an ally in the face of determined Soviet encroachment. This confidence cannot be restored by mere "tough talking" in Washington.

It is well known that a considerable number of the members of the Organization of African Unity are quietly concerned about Communist penetration, and hence secretly favour the Rhodesian settlement as a means to halt the advance of the Soviets and Cubans working through the "Patriotic Front". The assumption behind the Anglo-American proposals, i.e. that giving radicals power makes them more moderate is not justified by recent history in Africa. Moreover, to believe that any settlement acceptable to all parties will be respected is to ignore the personal, tribal and ideological conflicts which bedevil the whole continent. The leaders of pro-Western countries in black Africa, therefore, desire a Rhodesian solution which will not produce "another Angola", in other words, a solution which transfers power and an intact infrastructure to pro-Western black leaders receiving unqualified support from the West. If these black leaders of other African countries perceive not only that radicalism is the way to capture the attention of both Moscow and Washington but also that the

Carter Administration is not prepared to support avowedly pro-Western forces in Africa, then the consequence is likely to be increased opportunities for the Russians and Cubans to make trouble wherever the opportunity presents itself. *Whether the British and Americans like it or not, the Rhodesian issue has become part of the East-West conflict and is viewed as such by the rest of Africa.*

Q.10. What should we do about it?

A.10. Since it is obviously in the interests of the present British Government and the Carter Administration, to divert attention from the embarrassment the Rhodesian settlement causes those who proclaim their belief in democracy, human rights and self-determination, it is essential to question all statements on Rhodesia in the light of the facts. Unfortunately, time and time again, those responsible for the Anglo-American scheme manage to conceal their real intentions behind a facade of well-meaning platitudes.

Among the people of Britain, there exists a strong feeling of sympathy for the people of Rhodesia of all races, whose only appeal is "Give us the tools and we'll finish the job". We are not asking for your involvement, only for fair play and the chance to make our own settlement work.

If you feel that the undermining of the Salisbury Agreement by British and American politicians is callous and calculating, you can help by—

- (a) Asking your local MP exactly where he stands on the Rhodesian question, and precisely what action he proposes to take.
- (b) Writing to the newspapers pointing out the half-truths and distortions fed to the public by those who are openly or secretly working against the settlement.
- (c) Encouraging your friends to see the importance of understanding the Rhodesian problem and the constructive role each individual can play.

If the people of Britain were to express their support for the Rhodesian settlement, this would be of inestimable value in fostering a fair, peaceful and progressive solution.