

ZIMBABWE RHODESIAN

VIEWPOINT

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COMMONWEALTH PROPOSALS FOR ZIMBABWE RHODESIA

July/August, 1979

PRIME MINISTER ACCEPTS CONFERENCE INVITATION

PRIME MINISTER ABEL MUZOREWA HAS ACCEPTED AN INVITATION EXTENDED BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO ATTEND A CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE IN LONDON BEGINNING SEPTEMBER 10. THE DELEGATION FROM ZIMBABWE RHODESIA WILL BE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY.

The conference arises from proposals formulated by a group of countries attending the recent Commonwealth Conference in Lusaka. In addition to Britain the working group consisted of Zambia, Tanzania, Jamaica, Australia and Nigeria.

The text of the agreement which emerged from the discussions of this group was announced as follows: -

"Heads of Government had a frank discussion on the current problems of Southern Africa and their implications for the Commonwealth and the wider international community. While recognizing that certain developments since their meeting in London have now added new dimensions, they remained concerned by the potential dangers inherent in the existing situation. They therefore stressed the urgent need for finding satisfactory solutions to the remaining problems of this region.

"In relation to the situation in Rhodesia, Heads of Government therefore:

- a) Confirmed that they were wholly committed to genuine black majority rule for the people of Zimbabwe;
- b) Recognized, in this context, that the internal settlement constitution is defective in certain important respects;
- c) Fully accepted that it is the constitutional responsibility of the British Government to grant legal independence to Zimbabwe on the basis of majority rule;
- d) Recognized that the search for a lasting settlement must involve all parties to the conflict;
- e) Were deeply conscious of the urgent need to achieve such a settlement and bring peace to the people of Zimbabwe and their neighbors;
- f) Accepted that independence on the basis of majority rule requires the adoption of a democratic constitution including appropriate safeguards for minorities;
- g) Acknowledged that the Government formed under such an independence constitution must be chosen through free and fair elections, properly supervised under British Government authority, and with Commonwealth observers;
- h) Welcomed the British Government's indication that an appropriate procedure for advancing towards these objectives would be for them to call a constitutional conference to

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which all parties would be invited;

- 1) Consequently, accepted that it must be a major objective to bring about a cessation of hostilities and an end to sanctions as part of the process of implementation of a lasting settlement."

CHALLENGE FOR THE PATRIOTIC FRONT

An editorial in *THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR* (August 7) describes the plan as "perhaps the best opportunity since Rhodesian independence was declared 14 years ago to resolve the political conflict and bring the long and tragic civil war to an end. Bishop Muzorewa has carefully avoided rejecting the proposal and the task will be twofold: to sell the plan to the Patriotic Front guerrilla leaders and, most important, to persuade the whites in Zimbabwe Rhodesia to support the initiative and not panic and run."

The editorial says that "persuading the Patriotic Front leaders, especially Marxist Robert Mugabe, to join a constitutional conference will not be easy. Convincing the whites not to leave the country, thereby creating chaos and a political vacuum, will also be critical. But the whites ought to be reassured by Tanzanian President Nyerere's public recognition that it is fair for whites to hold a disproportionate share of parliamentary seats. This does not rule out altering the constitution to eliminate clauses permitting whites to block all change or rule out abandoning white control of the civil service, police and military. But it does suggest possibilities for giving whites special consideration. Surely this is a welcome acknowledgement that blacks and whites must govern together with sensitivity to each other's needs.

"As for Joshua Nkomo and Mr. Mugabe, they have an opportunity now to prove to their fellow Rhodesians and to the world that they do indeed favor 'free and fair' elections for determining the true political balance in Zimbabwe Rhodesia. With so many nations, including Rhodesia's immediate neighbors, backing the Lusaka plan, they will be under enormous pressure to join a constitutional conference. If they persist in wielding the gun and shooting it out, they will only alienate those voices who have long supported a multiparty solution and give them cause to throw their weight behind the present limited solution. The choice is theirs."

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR's Alexander MacLeod reported from Lusaka (August 8) that the Patriotic Front has reacted publicly to the Commonwealth proposals "by issuing demands that it says must be met if a new peace initiative is to produce an end to the guerrilla war and a lasting political settlement. A spokesman for Mr. Mugabe here said Bishop Abel Muzorewa and Ian Smith had to be removed, the present Rhodesian police and army disbanded and the Front's own troops installed as 'the army of the country', for progress to be possible.

MacLeod says British Prime Minister Mrs. Thatcher and her Foreign Secretary, Lord Carington, are not alarmed by such statements, "pinning their hope partly on the considerable leverage that the frontline African presidents believe they can exercise over both Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Mugabe." MacLeod notes that "British diplomatic assessments suggest that Mr. Nkomo and Mr. Mugabe are concerned that the war they are waging against the Salisbury government is by no means solidly supported by the blacks in whose territories they operate."

WALL STREET JOURNAL SCEPTICAL

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL is sceptical of the Commonwealth formula. An editorial (August 7) concludes: -

"It is of course an act of no small cynicism to sit down with a bunch of dictatorships and agree that the Zimbabwean regime must be literally reconstituted because some of its branches and processes are insufficiently plebiscitary in makeup. Beyond this small point of political morals, it is hard to see how the new attempt to find a universally acceptable

way of transferring power in Rhodesia is going to get around the obstacles that wrecked the old ones. Proposals for a peaceful transition have failed in the country in the past because some of the parties simply do not want to accept procedures that might give their opponents room for an internationally recognized victory; the present guerrilla warfare has done nothing to soften this determination.

"So when the delegates of the Commonwealth decree yet another round of Rhodesian instability, pressures, and exhortations, they may have found a perfectly good way to shelve their confrontation with one another over the issue; but they've certainly done nothing to secure the future of the country for which they profess to be so concerned. Mrs. Thatcher said she made her shift out of concern that simple British recognition of Zimbabwe would not end the war there. The alternative she has chosen hardly promises any better."

AN INCREMENTAL POLITICAL PLUS

NATIONAL REVIEW BULLETIN (August 24) comments in part as follows on the Lusaka formula: -

"Zambia's economy is a mess, dependent as it is on transport through Rhodesia. The balance in the Rhodesian guerrilla insurgency appears to be shifting against the Patriotic Front.

"On the other side of the power equation, Nigeria, which takes a hard-line position in favor of the Patriotic Front, tried to kick the Thatcher government in the teeth on the eve of the conference by nationalizing British Petroleum. This sent a message to Whitehall, mitigated by the fact that the North Sea is making Britain energy-independent.

"In its essentials, the Commonwealth plan is practically identical with Henry Kissinger's 1976 plan for a democratic and electoral solution. Kissinger's plan foundered on the belief of the Patriotic Front that political power really flows from the barrels of guns and not from ballot boxes. The Front rejected Kissinger.

"In 1979, however, Nkomo and Mugabe must weigh the consequences of another rejection. New realities have been created. Muzorewa won overwhelmingly. The absolute claims of the Front have been undercut by its own front-line sponsors, Kaunda and Nyerere.

"The Front will not - place your bets, 10 to 1 - submit to fair elections. But, when and if the Front refuses, it will be *seen* to have refused. Given the present defection of Kaunda and Nyerere, it will be fascinating to calibrate the Soviet response.

"Again, if you're placing bets, put your money on the collapse of the whole package. The different sides want incompatible things. Nkomo, Mugabe and the Soviets want *power*, not votes and constitutions. In a small way, however, the Lusaka proposal was an incremental political plus."

RISKY BUT HOPEFUL

THE WASHINGTON POST in an editorial (August 9) believes that "substantial risks are attached to the proposals for Zimbabwe Rhodesia that the British government has now embraced ...but if the proposal is risky it also contains much hope."

The editorial notes that "With Commonwealth sponsorship of a constitution written by the British, the Patriotic Front would face a hard choice. It would either have to submit at last to elections, or it would have to sacrifice its own claims to a legitimacy that is its principal asset and its sustenance. If there is still a chance to work towards democracy and peace simultaneously in Zimbabwe Rhodesia, this plan may well now be the only plausible route."

Henry Kissinger On the U.S. and Rhodesia

THE WASHINGTON POST, TUESDAY, JULY 3, 1979

The former secretary of state was interviewed last week in New York by Stephen S. Rosenfeld of the editorial page staff.

Q: Where did you leave Rhodesia?

A: The biggest problem in southern Africa was the relationship between the white and the black communities and the growing attempt of outside powers—especially the Soviet Union and Cuba—to use this process for their own geopolitical ends. We attempted to find a position which responded to the aspirations of the black majority, and at the same time permitted the black and white communities to live side by side.

We thought this essential for two reasons: First, if we could bring about a biracial society on the basis of black majority rule in Rhodesia while protecting minority rights, this would provide a bridge to solving the much more difficult problems of South Africa. Secondly, it would give us a platform compatible with our principles, from which we could resist radical and outside powers attempting to exploit this process for essentially geopolitical reasons.

By October 1978 we had arranged a conference, in which all the black Rhodesian leaders and Ian Smith participated—the only time all parties joined a negotiation. That conference started about three or four days before our election. After the defeat of Ford, it was clear that a different policy toward Africa would be followed by the new administration. As a result, the conference stalemated until the inauguration. Shortly afterward the conference blew up, partly because the radical members escalated their demands and partly because the new administration had lost interest in the existing framework.

Q: A "different policy"?

A: Overall in respect to Africa and also specifically toward Rhodesia. Certainly all the pronouncements promised a new approach to African problems and the tilt would be more toward the radical side.

Q: Thereby giving the Patriotic Front some reason to wait around a bit for a better deal?

A: The impression was created that the emotional sympathies were on the side of Mugabe. This tended to push Nkomo even closer to Mugabe and both thought they would get a better deal by holding out.

Q: How would you describe the Carter approach?

A: I believe that the administration approach operates on the assumption that we can win over the Third World radicals by co-opting their program. For the moderate group this may be possible. But for the rest I believe that it dooms us to chasing a mirage. The ideological radicals are usually anti-U.S., almost always anti-capitalist. Paradoxically, the closer we seek to approach this ideological group, the further we drive them away. Third World radicals cannot afford to be identified with the United States, and beyond a point approaching them radicalizes them even more.

Q: Wasn't your own Rhodesia plan co-opting some of the radical program?

A: My plan was to co-opt the program of moderate evolutionary reform, that is to say majority rule, and minority rights. At the same time we sought to create a kind of a firebreak between those whose radicalism was ideological and those whose radicalism was geared to specific issues. We could meet the demands for majority rule; we never thought we could co-opt the ideological radicals; our goal was to isolate them.

Q: How did you feel about the administration's understanding of African problems?

A: I believe they're operating on their own theory with which I do not agree.

Q: Still?

A: Still I think, in the case of Andy Young, they are applying the experience of the American civil-rights movement in the South. Young made a noble contribution there but the African context is totally different. The practical effect of this misconception is that in Africa we have been operationally on the side of the ideological radicals as against the moderates. The radicals have adopted a program of majority rule so extreme as to be incompatible with the survival of the minority and, therefore, incompatible with the peaceful evolution of the larger problem of South Africa.

Q: Does the internal settlement meet the requirements of your own plan of '78?

A: The issue is not any particular plan but a direction—specifically, where should be the weight of the American policy? Should we be on the side of those who are willing to rely on evolution, or on the side that seeks its aim by guerrilla warfare? Should we encourage the side willing to work for a biracial society, or the side who want a kind of absolute majority rule?

I fear that we have been in practice in favor of the radicals against the moderates. That course will lead to war between the races. But it is not too late to change, we still have some margin for maneuver and some time. This is why I am speaking out.

Q: One hears from this administration that if the United States is going to have the cooperation of the front-line states and of the rear-line states, if you will, like Nigeria, it has to make a political offer that even the radical Patriotic Front people will find acceptable.

A: But this reasoning will lead us to a vicious circle, because if the side that threatens to continue fighting can set the terms, then we are encouraging the continuation of the fighting and an escalation of radical demands. The inevitable result will be that the most radical element will dominate.

To take the example of the sanctions, I could see that a prudent administration would want to wait until it has a consensus, at least with Britain and with some other countries, on the lifting of sanctions. In that case we have a problem of timing. This could be accomplished without—as the administration has done—putting ourselves philosophically totally on the radical side.

When the White House attacked the constitutional provisions for protecting the minority as undemocratic, it really challenged any concept of constitutional guarantees. It is, after all, the essence of constitutional guarantees that they give the minority powers relatively disproportionate to their numbers. If the majority can do anything it wishes, you would not need constitutional guarantees. The criticism that the minority has disproportionate power could also be made against our Constitution. The Bill of Rights means that the majority of the Congress cannot do certain things.

In the case of Rhodesia we have gone beyond a tactical decision on lifting sanctions. We have put ourselves philosophically on the side of the radical version of majority rule. We have given political support to those who want to come to power by military means.

Q: Cyrus Vance is a good lawyer. How does he make this kind of mistake?

A: I would like to express my very high regard for Cyrus Vance. He is one of the most thoughtful and decent people I know and I sympathize with what he is up against. It is a different philosophy by the administration. Cyrus Vance's associates—certainly Andy Young—believe that the wave of the future is represented by the radical elements in Rhodesia and Africa. Therefore, they will not adopt a position that would be objected to either by the so-called Patriotic Front or by other radical African leaders.

This course will gain us short-term support. In the long term it will either fail and, when our impotence is patent, sour our relations with Nigeria and Tanzania. Or it will write the script for Soviet and Cuban intervention. Or it will succeed in Rhodesia and thereby make South Africa insoluble. We run the risk of a verbal position that is radical, a practical position that is impotent, and a theory justifying Cuban and Soviet intervention whenever they judge it is time to heat up conditions again.

Q: Vance and Carter profess to be pretty much at ease at the spectacle of nominally radical regimes coming to power in Rhodesia and perhaps elsewhere, too. They figure that the Soviet component is easy to exaggerate, and that local nationalism will take over.

A: I don't share this view because it is surely not relevant to southern Africa; nor is there much evidence for it elsewhere. It will force us inexorably on the road in which we produce chaos without contributing to a solution.

Q: Is Soviet policy in Rhodesia particularly inflammatory?

A: I would characterize it as maintaining the option of becoming inflammatory when it suits their purpose and giving enough support to the radical element to prevent an evolutionary solution. The growing radical trend is reflected in Nkomo's attitude. In 1975 and 1976, he was the only Rhodesian leader that we dealt with, and so far as I know, Nkomo relied on the West. Since then he must have made the judgment that the wave of the future is represented by the radical and pro-Soviet orientation; he has

moved to what, in his view, are the dominant trends. Our present policy is driving Nkomo inexorably to the radical side.

Q: Now we are waiting for the British to move in November on sanctions.

A: If the administration had said that the Rhodesian elections were essentially fair, that a biracial society with the protection of the minorities is just, even if some provisions could be improved, that the United States would prefer to see one more round of negotiation and pending that round of negotiation would make no major changes, I would have gone along. Especially if we had also made clear that if these negotiations failed because one group was determined to seize power by military means, then we would move in the direction of the elected government. I am not saying that the United States should recognize only Muzorewa, but it should not develop a public position which undermines the one elected leader in Rhodesia, and encourages guerrilla war rather than negotiations.

Q: There seem to be some tactical moves to accommodate that point of view. It's reported that Carter will probably see Muzorewa when he comes here.

A: This will be a step in the right direction. It is not natural for us, however, to lecture black leaders against minority rights. Our own black community could never have made its progress under undiluted majority rule.

If Britain now lifts the sanctions in November, it will be the fall guy. It will have done so in the face of a statement (June 7) by the United States, which will place the entire moral responsibility on Great Britain. This is not right, whatever one can say about this election, it was certified as relatively free by many impartial observers.

Q: Does the handling of this problem have wider application in the Third World?

A: I would raise questions whether the proclivity of many in the administration of leaning toward the ideological radicals impales us on the horns of a dilemma where our rhetoric is out of step with our capacities; our stated objectives out of tune with our public opinion. This is a prescription for impotence; it deprives us of any platform on which to stand if outside powers again decide to intervene.

Q: Do you find us in Nicaragua favoring the radical element?

A: I don't know enough about the various political alternatives in Nicaragua to have a reliable judgment. My impression is we did enough to unsettle the existing government but not enough to put over a moderate alternative, if there is one. As a result, by default, the dominant element threatens to become the Sandinistas, who are fundamentally anti-U.S. The radicals oppose us—painful as this may be for some to admit—not because of our policies but because of our social and economic structure.

Q: But are you now describing a situation in which we were locked, like it or not, to the Somozas of this world?

A: No, I—

Q: They always are operating in a situation which blocks out the growth of moderates.

A: No, it means that [when we move we must have a political purpose, not simply a rhetorical affirmation]. I could have understood a decisive move to replace Somoza with a moderate element. But this would have required the kind of covert action so much decried today.

Q: In the absence of a viable, moderate alternative, one would do better to stick with the devil one knows, with the shahs? With the Somozas?

A: I wouldn't put the shah into the same category. Somoza is a clearly less acceptable choice. But we have to make up our mind. We cannot

keep proclaiming that we learned the dangers of universal intervention in Vietnam and then elaborate a doctrine that amounts to universal intervention.

If the sole alternative to Somoza is the Sandinistas, we may reap the whirlwind. If the radical left becomes dominant in Central America, even Mexico will feel the pressure. So we should not define our alternatives by platitudes like "sticking with Somoza." We have no mission to change every unpalatable ruler; but if we attempt it we must assume responsibility for an outcome compatible with our values and our international responsibilities.

Q: But there are always people who will tell you that the Sandinistas in Nicaragua or the Islamic people in Iran or the Patriotic Front in Rhodesia are essentially nice guys. Andy Young said about one of the Patriotic Front persons, for instance, that he followed the Oakland Raiders.

A: I have no question that they're nice guys individually. The issue is political and geopolitical. Fundamentally, if we adopt the radical rhetoric, and program, we produce chaos and win no adherents. We will fall short of doing what the radicals demand, namely to support them with arms, with organization and with training for guerrilla wars. Eventually they will look elsewhere for these elements and they can do so based on our own doctrine.

Nor should we kid ourselves: The genuine ideological radicals prefer to come to power by struggle; they do not want compromise or "coalition government." I have noticed a statement by the Sandinistas the other day in which they said they want a revolutionary road to power. Within their frame of reference this is entirely honest, even honorable, despite the fact that it is against our interests. The same was essentially true of the Khomelni people in Iran, who also rejected compromise and coalition. Whether we like it or not, our natural allies are reformers, not radicals; moderate progressives, not ideologues.

Q: Isn't there a serious problem in distinguishing a moderate from a radical?

A: Certainly. That is what leaders are chosen to decide, however.

Q: One response would be that the Somozas are going to go into history's dust bin sooner or later and it's not the nuances of American policy that make the difference, it's the forces of history, and so we had better get with it, find the wave.

A: But then if we are going to get in the front of it, then we'd better have some sense of direction or we will be engulfed ourselves.

Q: But even you believe that we can come to a certain relationship with whatever new government emerges in Iran.

A: We certainly should develop the best possible relationship with the new government in Iran, however much I deplore our tactics last fall. Iran is an important country with which we must deal. But what has happened there has already radicalized the Middle East and gravely weakened our interests, undermined our friends in the area, regardless of what accommodation we eventually reach with Iran.

Q: Why aren't the Mexicans and other Latin countries in a better position to exert an influence in Nicaragua?

A: Because the Mexicans are in a terribly ambivalent position. They have a domestic ideology that makes it impossible to be to the right of the United States in international politics. They have basically a doctrine of nonintervention in the domestic affairs of other American states. We can therefore drive Mexico further left than its judgment would dictate by the wrong kind of rhetoric, even more so by the wrong

kind of actions. I know Mexico did not want Castro in Nicaragua, even when it sees no way to stop us from our course or finds it difficult to say so. I certainly favor a democratic, moderate government in Nicaragua; having gone this far we better make sure that we get this rather than a Castroite regime.

Q: What's the prognosis in Rhodesia?

A: A continuation of the war in which we have no clear-cut program or direct means of affecting the outcome. But we still have time; it is not too late to change course; we can still promote a peaceful moderate evolution. And I would happily support the administration in such a course.

Q: You see a deadlock in South Africa?

A: Major changes in South Africa are imperative for moral as well as political reasons. South Africa must dismantle the apartheid legislation. The offenses to human dignity that are involved in the separation of the races cannot go on. A political process by which the black majority can have a larger share in governmental power must begin.

Now, how to achieve this peacefully is an extremely complicated problem because parliamentary government developed in essentially homogeneous societies. And how you have a participation in government more commensurate with the numbers, without at the same time transforming the oppression of the majority by the minority into an oppression of the minority by the majority, that's a very subtle problem.

We should be on the side of change and also on the side of electoral processes; on the side of progress but also on the side of peaceful evolution. This is difficult and delicate, but not impossible. We still have time to promote peaceful, progressive change.

But it makes a lot of difference whether it is done in an atmosphere of moderation and evolution and an attempt of conciliation by both sides, or whether it is done in an atmosphere in which every change has been achieved by military means.

Q: Would your view that the United States should be very careful about trying to manage change, unless it has some clear view of where the other shore is, apply to internal developments in South Africa?

A: In general, yes. In South Africa, however, change is essential and we must be on its side. But we should also encourage democratic processes. I believe that this is more easily achievable and the outcome will be more humane with an attitude of compassion for the complexity of the problem than with an attitude of encouragement of the most radical elements.

Q: Even though understanding for the complexity can often be manipulated to make it come out as support for the status quo?

A: Any proposition can be manipulated for undesirable ends. I trust that we are wise and strong enough to know the distinction. I am asking us to define a position which reflects our values, but our values do not require the encouragement of radicalism. And we must be aware of the international dangers lest we create chaos without having an alternative.

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THE WAR AGAINST ZIMBABWE

RUSTIN URGES SUPPORT FOR MUZOREWA GOVERNMENT

"NO ELECTION HELD IN ANY COUNTRY AT ANY TIME WITHIN MEMORY HAS BEEN MORE WIDELY OR VICIOUSLY SCORPED BY INTERNATIONAL OPINION THAN THE ELECTION CONDUCTED LAST APRIL IN RHODESIA, NOW ZIMBABWE RHODESIA. IN SCORES OF OTHER COUNTRIES, NON-DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS PERIODICALLY STAGE ELECTIONS WHOSE PREDETERMINED RESULTS ARE NEVER CHALLENGED OR QUESTIONED, EVEN BY THE WORLD'S DEMOCRACIES.....FEW CRITICS OF THE ELECTION HAVE EVEN PRETENDED TO HAVE AN OPEN MIND ON THE SUBJECT..... AND A GROUP OF 99 AMERICANS, RANGING FROM INTELLECTUALS AND OTHERS ON THE FAR LEFT TO LIBERAL CIVIL-RIGHTS AND LABOR LEADERS, ISSUED A STATEMENT A MONTH BEFORE THE ELECTION CALLING IT A 'FRAUD' SINCE 'THE PEOPLE OF ZIMBABWE CANNOT VOTE FREELY WITH A GUN AT THEIR HEADS.'"

"CONTRARY TO THESE PREDICTIONS AND OPINIONS, HOWEVER, THE PEOPLE OF ZIMBABWE DID VOTE IN AN ELECTION THAT WAS FREER THAN MOST HELD IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD - FREER, CERTAINLY, THAN ELECTIONS HELD ANYWHERE IN AFRICA WITH THE EXCEPTION OF GAMBIA, BOTSWANA, AND POSSIBLY SEVERAL OTHER SMALL COUNTRIES. MOREOVER, NOT ONLY DID THEY NOT VOTE WITH 'A GUN AT THEIR HEADS,' MANY VOTED WITH GENUINE, UNMISTAKABLE ENTHUSIASM. THE CONTRAST BETWEEN HOW THE ELECTION WAS VIEWED BY MOST ZIMBABWEANS (THE NAME PREFERRED BY THE BLACKS) AND HOW IT WAS DESCRIBED BY CRITICS OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY IS NOTHING LESS THAN EXTRAORDINARY."

-Bayard Rustin, National Chairman of Social Democrats, U.S.A., long-time civil rights leader, writing in the July issue of COMMENTARY magazine-

In his COMMENTARY article Bayard Rustin records his findings on the elections in Zimbabwe Rhodesia as an observer with the Freedom House group. Rustin deplores the failure of American policy to support the popularly elected Muzorewa government against its totalitarian adversaries. He concludes: -

"The psychology of appeasement is now so deeply rooted among most American officials and political commentators that they have, almost as a matter of course, underestimated our own strengths and the strengths of our friends, as well as the weaknesses of the Soviet position. U.S. officials tremble at the thought of a Nigerian oil embargo, forgetting the fact that Nigeria needs American capital and technology at least as much as America needs Nigerian oil. Most importantly, within Zimbabwe Rhodesia itself, there is now less sympathy for the guerrillas than ever before. The people are simply tired of violence, especially violence which has no purpose, since there is now a black majority government. If this government takes steps, as it has promised, to improve the social and economic position of the black population, the rate at which the guerrillas will defect to become part of the new order could increase dramatically. It is also possible that the Patriotic Front leaders will now negotiate with the Bishop if, as the London Economist has observed, they 'are not to risk becoming the 30-year Arafats of southern Africa.' Moreover, Zambia and Mozambique, which have suffered badly from the fighting and are heavily dependent on the much stronger economies of Zimbabwe Rhodesia and South Africa, are already under pressure internationally to end their support of the Patriotic Front and to accommodate the new reality. Zambia is particularly vulnerable since more than half its trade and most of its food imports are now carried by rail through Zimbabwe Rhodesia.

"Whether Moscow would be prepared, under these circumstances, to escalate the war is doubtful. At present, the army of Zimbabwe Rhodesia is, in African terms, a strong fighting force and more than a match for the divided Patriotic Front. To defeat it would require a major commitment by Soviet proxy forces at a time when the Cubans are overextended in Angola (where they now maintain a force of 45,000 military and civilian personnel). An intervention of this kind would be deeply resented in most of Africa, and it would strengthen opposition

to detente in this country and weaken whatever chance there is for Senate ratification of SALT.

"The Russians will, more likely than not, remain cautious and wait for an opportune moment to strike. The point is that it should not be our policy to create opportunities for them and to encourage the guerrillas to continue fighting, which is what the President's repudiation of the Muzorewa government in his June 7 statement has already done. Beyond the narrow issue of economic sanctions against Zimbabwe Rhodesia, there is the larger question of whether we will do anything to help the new black government to survive and continue to evolve in a democratic direction; or whether, by our inaction and failure of nerve, we will embolden its enemies and thus destroy any hope for democracy in the country. If we take the latter course, we will have done nothing to increase the credibility of the United States either in Africa or elsewhere. On the contrary, we will have raised a signal to all the world that this country no longer has the capacity to defend or even understand its interests, or to help those who, unlike ourselves, continue to believe in freedom."

COMMENTS AT RANDOM

SHADOW OF MUNICH ON ZIMBABWE RHODESIA

"Selling out Bishop Muzorewa can only postpone the moment of truth. At best it will buy time. It will mean that Mrs. Thatcher and President Carter can bequeath the problem to some successor government, but a tougher Anglo-American policy now might actually avert the problem altogether, since a successful multi-racial experiment in Zimbabwe Rhodesia - which can be successful only if it is backed by Britain and America - might well result in a breakdown of extremism on both sides of the racial divide, as much in white Africa as in black. As it is, however, it looks as if Britain and America lack any determination to support Bishop Muzorewa. He has been told he must be nastier to the whites, the very group that is fighting hardest to defeat his enemies, which is tantamount to asking him to dig his own grave.

"Not since the Czechs were thrown to the Nazi wolves at Munich has there been such a cynical betrayal, which is to be doubly condemned - as was the previous outrage - for serving neither interest nor honour."

-Peregrine Worsthorne, writing in THE SUNDAY TELEGRAPH (London), July 15, 1979-

GIVE MUZOREWA A CHANCE TO SUCCEED

"Rhodesia has made racial discrimination illegal. A majority of voters have spoken eloquently. A black Prime Minister is inaugurated. He is appointing key ministers and other officials. He has called upon the insurgents in and out of the country to participate in building a new society.

"In Zimbabwe Rhodesia, the success of the Muzorewa government offers the best chance for developing a multiracial, democratic state with protection of human rights for both the majority and minority.

"The American people, I believe, are increasingly convinced this is so, and want the Muzorewa Government to be given a chance to succeed."

-Former Senator Clifford Case, writing in the NEW YORK TIMES, June 1, 1979-

CONSTITUTIONAL COMPROMISES ARE ROOTED IN REALITY

"Good constitutions are always the end result of a series of delicate compromises rooted in the reality of the here and now. Zimbabwe Rhodesia's black leaders were consulted on each provision of the constitution. They gave their approval after hard bargaining. They agreed to the 28-seat provision because they knew that most whites would not stay without such a guarantee. They further knew that, without European managerial and technical expertise, Zimbabwe Rhodesia's economic future would be bleak—which is precisely the case with its neighbors, Angola, Mozambique and Zaire, which offered no such assurances to their white minorities.

Pure theory is often compromised in order to preserve more important goals—for example, the survival of a nation and, in this case, any future hope in Zimbabwe Rhodesia for a majoritarian democracy. The denial of recognition for Muzorewa's government means that a near-democratic regime may not survive long enough to improve its form of government. We in the United States had more than a century to make a more perfect union; the Zimbabwe Rhodesians are asking for a decade.

"Zimbabwe Rhodesia may not survive, because it is challenged by men who are not enthusiastic about democracy in any known form. Robert Mugabe, the Mozambique-based guerrilla leader, openly proclaims his devotion to Marxism. Joshua Nkomo, operating from Zambia, publicly scorns electoral democracy.

"Moral principle is vital to American foreign policy. But it must be applied consistently, and with great care for the consequences. It must meet the test of choosing the good when the best is not possible. Zimbabwe Rhodesia provides a classic example of such a choice."

-Stefan A. Halper and Roger W. Fontaine, writing in the LOS ANGELES TIMES, July 16, 1979-
(Halper & Fontaine are senior associates of the Center for Strategic & International Studies in Washington, D.C.)

PRO-WESTERN DEMOCRACY UNDERMINED

"One of the more depressing ironies of the President's decision to continue the sanctions against Zimbabwe Rhodesia is that it undermines a pro-Western, democratically elected, multi-party government in a situation where the sole realistic alternative is a pro-Soviet black dictatorship. And if that is not disconcerting enough, Carter asks us to believe that his policy represents 'in international affairs what our nation stands for, what our people believe in'."

-Carl Gershman, writing in the NEW LEADER, June 18, 1979-
(Gershman is the Executive Director of Social Democrats, U.S.A.)

POLITICAL ACTIVISM BY WORLD COUNCIL OF CHURCHES

ANALYTICAL STUDY BY PROFESSOR LEFEVER

IN AMSTERDAM TO NAIROBI: THE WORLD COUNCIL OF CHURCHES AND THE THIRD WORLD PROFESSOR ERNEST LEFEVER TRACES THE MOVEMENT OF THE WCC "FROM A LARGELY WESTERN DEMOCRATIC CONCEPT OF POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY TO A MORE RADICAL IDEOLOGY THAT BY 1975 EMBRACED THE CONCEPT AND PRACTICE OF LIBERATION THEOLOGY," WHICH "BEARS A STRIKING RESEMBLANCE TO MARXISM." LEFEVER DISCUSSES IN HIS BOOK THE 1978 WCC GRANT TO THE PATRIOTIC FRONT GUERRILLAS SEEKING TO OVERTHROW RHODESIA'S INTERRACIAL GOVERNMENT.

In a foreword George F. Will writes that "readers of Professor Lefever's essay can decide for themselves the extent to which bad sociology, bad theology, bad faith and, yes, sin feed on one another and are to blame for what the WCC has been doing."

The book is published by the Ethics and Public Policy Center of Georgetown University, of which Professor Lefever is the founding director.

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AMSTERDAM TO NAIROBI: THE WORLD COUNCIL OF CHURCHES AND THE THIRD WORLD. \$5 paperback.
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